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The thesis focuses on official and unofficial American views of Russian national 
interests as revealed in the discussion about NATO enlargement. It begins with a theoretical 
investigation of the concept of the national interest based on the approach of the realist 
school. Specifically, two positions are considered: namely, the power position and the 
security position. The thesis applies this theory to the discussion of Russian national 
interests in NATO enlargement. It reveals a host of attitudes behind official US policy some 
of them contradictory. These tell us interesting things about American attitudes toward 
Russia and about the motives behind US support for NATO enlargement. 
The theoretical examination of the concept of the national interest and its practical 
application in the investigation of American views of Russian national interests in NATO 
enlargement establish the foundation for a sociological survey aimed at assessing the 
perceptions of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement among American military 
officers at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. 
Chapter I, the introduction, briefly describes current geopolitical realities in Europe 
and introduces central issues of the thesis. 
Chapter II discusses the notion of the national interest from the viewpoint of 
political science theory. It analyzes the notion of the national interest on the basis of two 
approaches of the realist school--namely, the power and security positions--and gives them 
a critical assessment. Then the national interest is classified and is studied on the basis of a 
matrix. 
Chapter III creates and examines theoretical constructs of American unofficial 
views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement, and on this basis, tests two 
hypotheses connected with the official US position. 
Chapter IV considers the results of the sociological survey. 
Chapter V evaluates the validity and utility of the notion of the national interest 
based on the classification and the matrix of the national interest. It also focuses on the 
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According to the most recent official statement of US national security policy, "A 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," with the end of the Cold War, 
"The primary security imperative of the past half century--containing communist expansion 
while preventing nuclear war--was gone. Instead, we confronted a complex array of new 
and old security challenges ... "1 The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have led to a new geopolitical situation. The rigid bilateral European system 
and the presence of nuclear weapons had provided a more or less stable peace in Europe. 
With the end of that system, NATO has to decide what mission or missions it will have in 
the new environment. The decision has been made to modernize the alliance in order to 
meet new security requirements. 
So what is the new NATO? In order to answer this question it is necessary to look at 
the initial purpose behind NATO's creation in 1949. According to the first secretary-general 
of the alliance, Lord Ismay, the idea of NATO was to "Keep the Russians out, the 
Americans in, and the Germans down."2 Beginning with NSC-68 (1950), NATO's primary 
purpose was the containment of the Soviet Union, a policy that continued until the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991. The end of the Cold War, according to Senator Joseph Biden, led 
NATO to "a crisis ofidentity."3 The question, "What is NATO for?'' is closely connected to 
the questions "What is NATO enlargement for?" With respect to my thesis, this crisis of 
identity raises the question, "What are the Russian national interests in NATO enlargement 
as seen from the American perspective?" The purpose of this thesis is to explore this 
question. 
1 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House. 1996. p. 1. 
2 Josef Joffe, "Is There Life After Victory?" The National Interest, Fall1995, p. 25. 
3 Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States 
Senate. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1994. p. 2. 
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The general goal of the thesis is a better understanding of the rationale behind US 
foreign policy toward Russia in general and regarding NATO enlargement in particular. 
Chapter II discusses two realist-school approaches to the notion of the national 
interest: namely, the power position and the security position. The aim is to assess these 
approaches in terms of their practical utility in today' s international politics. This chapter 
also focuses on the formation of the national interest and proposes classification based on 
those put forward by Frankel and Nuechterlein. 
Chapter III examines theoretical constructs of unofficial American v1ews 
concerning Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. These constructs include two 
different rationales for why NATO enlargement should be pursued and what impact NATO 
enlargement has on Russian national interests, and a third one which argues that NATO 
enlargement should not occur. 
Chapter IV discusses a sociological survey created conducted specifically for this 
thesis at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. The 
aim of the survey is to understand American military officers' views of Russian national 
interests in NATO enlargement. The results of the survey will be considered in terms of 
their relation to any of the above-mentioned theoretical constructs and the US official 
position. 
Chapter V investigates the validity of the theoretical approach to the notion of the 
national interest and evaluates tested hypotheses. 
2 
II. THE NATIONAL INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The prime purpose of this section is not to persuade or dissuade the reader of the 
existence of the notion of the national interest. The purpose is to look at this notion as a 
conceptual approach aimed at better understanding state behavior in international relations 
and international relations in general. 
The national interest is often considered to be obscure, subjective and hard to define. 
Another difficulty is the existence of different approaches to the definition of the national 
interest. 
The beginning of the application of the notion of national interest can be dated back 
to the time of Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. According to the treaty all states were 
considered to be subjects of international relations. The foundation of relations was the 
compatibility or balance of national interests. 
At the theoretical level different schools of political science have treated the notion 
of national interest differently. For example, Marxists rejected it. In fact the theoreticians of 
Marxism did not examine directly the notion of the national interest. Lenin connected the 
issue of national interest with a subjective class approach rather than taking into account 
objective geopolitical variables. However, in the 19111 century Engels noted, "The ruling 
class only because it is ruling bears responsibility for the position of the whole nation and is 
obliged to take care of common interests."
4 Thus, even proponents of a class approach in 
political science admitted the existence of objective interests. 
Another difficulty is connected with the assumption that in multinational states 
various nations' interests may not coincide, and even may contradict each other. In 
principle, this may be true, but that does not exclude the fact that, normally, all nations 
within the same state face the same challenges in their external environment. Further in this 
thesis the notion of the national interest will comprise the interest of a nation in a 
4 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Polnoye sobranie sochineniy, vol. 2 (Moscow, 1955.), p. 355. 
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homogeneous state or common interests of various nations in a multinational state. Here 
national interest equals state interest. The national interest in international politics is defined 
as the realized needs and aspirations of a nation in relation to challenges"the nation faces in 
its external environment. 5 
One more methodological problem may arise when the national interest is examined 
from two other approaches, namely, the national interest as political analysis and as political 
action. The methodological difference between the two interests is the following: 
As an analytical tool, it [i.e., the concept of the national interest] is 
employed to describe, explain, or evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a 
nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it serves as a 
means of justifying, denouncing or proposing policies. Both usages, in other 
words, refer to what is best for a national society. They also share a tendency 
to confine the intended meaning to what is best for a national society. 
Beyond these general considerations, however, the two uses of the concept 
have little in common.6 
However, as Joseph Frankel noted, 
This analytical distinction appeals to common sense, but does not offer 
the means for further logical analysis or for empirical investigation. Within 
each argument, by whomever it is made, there is no clear-<;:ut distinction 
between these two uses of the concept. When we discuss whether it is in the 
national interest of a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to 
maintain the organization, this involves both the discussion ofNATO as an 
instrument of national strategy and a prescription, be it to maintain or to 
reduce defenses against Soviet communism. 7 
Bearing this distinction in mind, it is useful to stress that both political analysis and 
political action are two sides of the same coin. They are both parts of political decision-
making. At the first stage both political science scholars and politicians are involved in the 
political analysis of the national interest, while at the second stage politicians make 
6 
This definition is adapted from Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommited: United States National 
Interests in the 1980s (The University Press ofKentucky, 1985), p. 7. 
International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences (1968, p. 34), cited in Joseph Frankel, National Interest 
(London, Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.16. 
4 
decisions based on this analysis and aimed at achieving the national interest. Further in this 
study this distinction will be made where it is necessary. 
A. REALISTS' APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
The scholars belonging to the realist school, like Hans Morgenthau, Nicholas 
Spykman and Kenneth Waltz, have made the major contribution to the theory of the 
national interest. So it is advisable to examine their approach to the issue. 
1. General Description of the Realists' Theory 
For better understanding it is necessary to focus on the following peculiarities of 
their theory: 
a. Anarchy in International Relations 
Following the Hobbesian description of the international system as one of 
anarchy, realists stress the absence of a higher formal authority or world government. Good 
will is not the instrument which can regulate international relations. As Kenneth Waltz 
noted, "Among states as among men there is no automatic adjustment of the interests. In the 
absence of supreme authority, there is then, constant possibility that conflicts will be settled 
by force."8 
h. A Self-Help System in International Relations 
According to another fundamental assumption of the realists a state can 
preserve its independence only by being self-reliant. "Each actor is ultimately responsible 
for its own survival. Pledges, promises, and good will notwithstanding, no actor can 
surrender its fate to another and remain even a theoretical equal."
9 
Joseph, Frankel, National Interest (London, Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.16. 
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York, 1959), p. 188. 
9 Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics, 2nd edition (Englewood Cliffs, N. 
J. Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp.109-110. 
5 
c. A Nation-state in International Relations 
A nation-state is not free in its behavior. It is an actor which has to play by 
objective laws. These laws are possible to study. As Hans Morgenthau emphasized, 
There is a rational element in political action that makes politics 
susceptible to theoretical analysis, but there is also a contingent element in 
politics that obviates the possibility of theoretical understanding. The 
material with which the theoretician of politics must deal is ambiguous. The 
events he must try to understand are, on the one hand, unique occurrences: 
They happened in this way only once and never before or since. On the other 
hand, they are similar; for they are manifestations of social forces. Social 
forces are the product of human nature in action. Therefore, under similar 
circumstances, they will manifest themselves in a similar manner. 10 
But a similar manner does not mean the same manner. The task of a policy-
maker is to make a two-level comparative analysis. The first one is diachronic from present 
to past and is based on the analysis of the cases belonging to past experience. The second 
one is synchronic and is based on the analysis of the present cases. Such comparative 
analysis makes it possible to work out A, B, C patterns of policy-making. Comparative 
analysis makes it possible to identify a new occurrence as unique in its properties but close 
to, for example, pattern C and far from pattern A and B. In this particular case, it will be a 
C 1 pattern, combining properties of the C pattern and ones unique to this case. 
10 
Political scientist Arnold Wolfers argues, 
Some degree of uniformity of behavior among actors belonging to any 
specific category is so persistently present that even the historian takes 
account of it at least by implication. It would make no sense for him to use 
terms like great power, landlocked country, or have-not nation in dealing 
with historical actors if it were not proper to assume that those who belong 
to one of these generic groups share one or more common traits of 
behavior ... 11 
Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Power (NewYork, 1970), p. 254. 
11 Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore. 1962), p. 45. 
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As a matter of fact, analyzing the Russian foreign policy at the beginning of 
the 20th century we can draw a certain analogy with the present time. In the period between 
1905-1914 to some extent Russia faced the same general tasks and had the same interests in 
its foreign policy as it is facing today. First, being a great power, the country is searching 
for its place in evolving multipolar world. Second, its foreign policy is aimed at ensuring a 
favorable international environment. At the beginning of the century, estimating the policy 
of state and economic development, Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky noted, "After recent 
external and internal shake-ups Russia needs period of concentration of power and peaceful 
state-building."12 The task of diplomacy was to ensure the most favorable international 
conditions for this state-building. 
Nevertheless, we should not exaggerate the strength of rationality in policy-
making, since it is difficult to perceive and predict human nature and contingencies. But it is 
possible to state, with Morgenthau that "the element of rationality, order, and regularity lies 
in the limited number of possible choices within each system of multiple choice. Viewed 
with the guidance of a rationalistic, blueprinted map, the social world is, indeed, a chaos of 
contingencies. Yet it is not devoid of a measure of rationality if approached with the modest 
expectations of a circumspect theory."13 
d. A Nation-state has a Set of Well-defined Interests. 
Being a rational actor in the ocean of international relations, a state makes 
rational choices in defining and achieving national interests. Any state chooses a policy in 
terms of costs and benefits with a view to maximizing its interests. The primary national 
interest of a state is self-preservation or survival, while all other interests are subordinate to 
this one. 
12 Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sozyv 3. Sessiya 2. Stenographicheskiye Otschety (Saint-Peterburg, 1908), p. 2620. 
13 Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Power (New York, 1970), p. 5. 
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B. THE POWER APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
The foundation for the power approach to the study of the national interest was laid 
down by such classical realpolitik theorists as Hans Morgenthau and Nicholas Spykman. 
Morgenthau sees this approach as "the concept of interest defined in terms of power."14 In 
his opinion, "A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to 
demonstrate power."15 
1. The Definition of Power 
According to Spykman "power means survival, the ability to impose one's will on 
others, the capacity to dictate to those who are without power, and the possibility of forcing 
concessions from those with less power."16 One's power "depends not only on military 
forces but on many other factors-size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, 
absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial 
strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national 
spirit."17 Some components of power can be quantitative, while others are hard to quantify. 
It is possible to look at the theoretical background of power in Morgenthau's terms: "The 
concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, 
infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics."18 In this way, power can 
rationalize an area so subjective as politics. But the power of a nation has a relative 
character. It depends not only on the power components of the nation itselfbut on the power 
of other nations. 
The desire to obtain and increase power leads to a balance-of-power policy whose 
"purpose is to influence directly the power position of other states, to weaken some, to 
14 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power (New York, 1973), p. 5. 
15 Ibid., p. 40. 
16 Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power (New 
York, 1942), p. 18. 
17 Ibid., p. 19. 
18 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power, p. 5. 
8 
strengthen others."19 For realists, power is the most reliable and credible prerequisite of a 
state's well-being. "Experience has shown that there is more safety in balanced power than 
in a declaration of good intentions."20 However, the balance in itself is meaningless and 
insufficient if it does not meet another requirement. As Spykman stressed, "The truth of the 
matter is that states are interested only in a balance which is in their favor. There is no real 
security in being just as strong as a potential enemy; there is security only in being a little 
stronger."21 Thus, according to Spykman, the power of the state lays down the foundation of 
the policy of the state and it can only be limited by the power of its opponent. 
Thus, to a great extent for Morgenthau and Spykman power is an instrument and an 
end in itself in foreign policy "because in the last instance only power can achieve the 
objectives of foreign policy."22 The implication here is that to maximize power means to 
achieve the national interest. 
C. AN ANALYSIS OF THE POWER APPROACH IN ASSESSING NATIONAL 
INTEREST 
Arnold Wolfers compares the role of power in international relations to the role of 
money in a market economy. He divides people into three groups: a) people who need 
money to meet their basic requirements in life; b) people who accumulate money as reserve 
and to obtain freedom of action; and c) people who value money as an end in itself. In 
Wolfers' opinion states are like people. For the first group of states, power is necessary as a 
tool to achieve set goals or national interests. This is the most numerous group. For the 
second group, power is necessary as a reserve to achieve future goals or to defend national 
interests when they are not challenged yet. For the third group, power is necessary as an end 
19 Spykman, p. 19. 
20 Ibid., p. 20. 
21 Ibid., p. 21. 
22 Ibid., p. 18. 
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in itself. Power for them is an inexplicable race for the sake of power. Morgenthau's 
passion for power coincides with the drive of the third group of states. 
Nowadays power cannot be an end in itself in its classical realist meaning for 
several reasons. First, objectively, due to the growing world interdependence, "in the 
emerging structure, national power is much more diffused, making the exertion of influence 
by any nation over any other nation much more difficult."23 Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
stress that "adequacy is a matter of subjective estimates, the factors which influence these 
estimates are of major interest. Two countries having the same goals and acting under 
similar circumstances may differ widely in their views on adequacy of power."
24 
Second, the present state of global development has a controversial character. 
Despite deepening interdependency, "major change in the external security environment is 
found in the evolving structure of the post-cold war international political system. It is not 
only much more fragmented, but at the same time more independent. "25 
The end of Cold War speeded up the alterations in the priority of power 
components. The importance of military power is giving way to economic and 
technological sources of national power. For example, the United States has adopted the 
concept of "forward presence." 
Forward presence recognizes the strategic implications of global 
integration and interdependence-the relevant choice for great powers now 
and in the future is either to influence global events or to be influenced by 
them. Forward presence also recognizes the increased importance of 
nonmilitary instruments of power relative to the military. The new role of 
forward presence forces, properly understood, is not to defend US interests 
23 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Jr., and Lawrence J. Korb, American National Security. Policy and Process 
(The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), p. 531. 
24 Wolfers, p. 94. 
25 Jordan, et al., p. 531. 
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directly but to provide leverage for diplomatic and economic instruments of 
policy.26 
However, military power is still regarded as indispensable t0 achieve national 
interests when peaceful means fail. So far it is far too early to write off the significance of 
the military in the assessment of power. 
Going back to Spykman's definition of power cited above, it is necessary to admit 
that in the present world it may sound too extreme. Today another definition of power 
might be more acceptable: " The general capability of a state to influence the behavior of 
others."27 But it would be appropriate to view power not only as capability to influence the 
behavior of another state but also the capability to resist another's influence. Power is the 
means to achieve national interests with the priority given to the peaceful components of 
power. 
D. THE SECURITY APPROACH TO THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
In theoretical terms, realists examine the notion of security from two perspectives. 
Namely, objective and subjective. In the first perspective, "security, in an objective sense, 
measures the absence of threats to acquired values."28 At the unit level of analysis, balance 
among a nation's/or a state's power components can be undermined by changes among 
them. For example, the increase of a state's military power at the expense of other 
components of national power may surpass the level of sufficiency necessary to defend the 
country. At the structural level of analysis such change in configuration of the sources of a 
nation's side power will lead to a shift in interstate relations, namely, to changes in the 
balance of power. This in its turn creates the basis to measure the threat to the "acquired 
values" of a state. At the subjective level security is "the absence of fear that such values 
26 Don M. Snider, p. 46. 
27 Jordan, eta!., p. 25. 
28 Wolfers, p. 150. 
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will be attacked."29 However, from the subjective level of the security approach it is not 
enough to change the balance of power. Fear of the nation's values being attacked 
materializes when there is a credible sign of hostility. 
According to realist theory, "basic to all kinds of national self-interest is survival or 
self-preservation, for upon national survival depends the achievement of all other self-
interested ends."3° From this point of view, security is the condition or a tool to achieve 
survival. But there is another approach to security where it is a primary goal rather than 
simply a tool. Under "a high-threat system, the hierarchy of state interests is dominated by 
security. Although security interests and other interests reinforce each other over the long 
term, in the short term they occasionally come into conflict and, when that happens security 
interests are given priority. The primary means to security is power."31 The essence of the 
national interest is to maximize security. 
E. AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECURITY APPROACH IN ASSESSING 
NATIONAL INTEREST 
From this approach it is possible to consider security as the foundation of the 
national interest and power as the intermediate stage towards achieving security or as an 
instrument to achieve it. However, when one side makes an attempt to attain security only 
by accumulating power, a feeling of insecurity affects policy-makers ofthe opposite side. In 
its turn the second side will have to take reactive measures to ensure its security. In this 
way, the situation tends to be even less secure in the long run. The term to describe this state 
of affairs is a "security dilemma." 
Assessing the role of military power in achieving security, i.e., the national interest, 
the importance of such power is declining today. Though strong armed forces were and are 
29 Ibid., p. 150. 
30 Robert Osgood, Ideals and Self--Interest in America's Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953), p. 5 
31 Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stem, Charles 
Tilly. eds., vol. I. (Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 225. 
12 
a very important condition to ensuring the national interest, attempts to use military power 
to strengthen the relations with other countries tend to be less fruitful. Local wars and 
conflicts indicate how difficult, sometimes impossible it is to transform military power into 
long-term political influence. Military power cannot play the decisive role it used to play to 
ensure security in international relat~ons. The use of military power is becoming 
unacceptable and is rejected by many political institutions. For example, current Russian 
Military Doctrine states, "The Russian Federation ensures its military security by the 
aggregation of all available means under the priority of political, diplomatic and other 
peaceful means."32 This attitude does not exclude military factors from policy-making but 
recognizes an attempt to form a national security policy on a purely military basis tends to 
spiral into an insecure environment. As a result such policy "can lead to war in the absence 
of any genuine conflicts of strategic, economic, or ideological interests between states. 
Thus, states may prefer peace but rationally choose war.'m 
The security dilemmas can put a state on the verge of bankruptcy or even collapse. 
The fate of the Soviet Union is an example of a country having paid too high a price to 
reach these goals. Its security policy led to huge waste of material resources, an 
accumulation of surplus armaments and, as a result, a low living standard for the Soviet 
people. All these factors were a heavy burden for the state and constituted one of the 
reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
In today' s world, the aims of the national security and foreign policy overlap with 
the sphere of national interests. The relationship between foreign policy and national 
security policy can be depicted in the following way.34 
32 Voennaya Mysl (Moscow, November 1993), p. 5-6. 
33 Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, p. 227. 
34 Figure I is adapted from Jordan, et al., p. 4. 
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Domestic Policy , .... t---- National Security 
~-.:;::::- - - .... 1---- National Interest 
• Foreign Policy 
Figure 1. Relationship Between Foreign and National Security Policy 
The overlapping zone is the national interest, at which both national security and 
foreign policy are aimed. This is the national interest related only to international politics. 
F. THE FORMATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
The national interest is formed at two levels: objective and subjective. As Wolfers 
stressed, "The actors can be pictured in matrix of internal and external forces that affect 
their behavior through pulls and pressures."35 Political scientists and policy-makers have to 
take into account geopolitical factors which they cannot or can hardly change but which 
have an effect on policy. Other factors-historical, socio-economic, political and military-
are less objective but they lay down the foundation for definition of the national interest at 
the subjective level and further for political decision-making. 
Wolfers also noted a necessary condition to determine the national interest: 
"Decisions and actions in the international arena can be understood, predicted, and 
manipulated only in so far as the factors influencing the decision can be identified and 
isolated."36 So the task is to identify these factors and to determine their degree of influence. 
35 Wolfers., p. 37. 
36 Ibid., p. 37. 
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G. DETERMINANTS OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
The national interest has objective and subjective determinants. 
1. Objective Determinants 
Objective determinants of the national interest can be divided into: 
a. Geopolitics 
According to the classical definition, "geopolitics was regarded as the 
narrow study of how geography affects foreign policy and military strategy. Most often, 
geopolitics is latent or even inactive."37 
In the 19th century Lord Palmerston argued that Britain did not have either 
eternal enemies or eternal allies; what it had were eternal interests, which Britain ought to 
follow. Such an approach was explained by the geographical position of the country. 
Nevertheless, when geopolitical changes occur they create another environment leading to 
new political and military concepts aimed at defending national interests. For example, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union led to such a geopolitical situation that the United States had to 
articulate the above-mentioned concept of"forward presence" while NATO found itself in a 
search of a new identity. Today Russia faces the same geostrategic issues which she was 
solving from the 18th to the beginning of the 20th century. Namely, after the creation of 
independent states in Ukraine and in the Baltics and the loss of the ports and naval bases 
there, Russia has to resolve the problem of access to the Black and the Baltic seas. Along 
with this the long-time issue of the Bosforus straits is once again important. On the whole, 
although being a successor of the Soviet Union because of its altered geopolitical position, 
Russia cannot play the role of a superpower it used to play before. 
b. Historical, Socio-economic, Political, and Military Factors. 
These factors must be taken into account. To a great extent politicians are 
not free in making their decisions. They find themselves hostages of the above-mentioned 






factors and decisions made by their predecessors. At this level the nation's place in the 
geopolitical system, its potential and capability to influence geopolitical processes, is 
defined. 
In the combination of these two levels, "the psychology of the actors in the 
international arena, instead of operating in limitless space, is confmed in its impact on 
policy by limitations that external conditions-the distribution of power, geographical 
location, demography, and economic condition-place on choices open to governments in 
the conduct of foreign relations."38 
2. The Subjective Aspect of the National Interest 
The subjective aspect of the national interest is connected with the extent of 
realization of its objective aspect and is the perceived estimation by a nation, bureaucratic 
organization, a decision-making group or an individual decision-maker. This estimation 
·finds its expression in the pursued policy. 
The subjective aspect is not as rigid as the objective one and is open to compromises 
and concessions. The leadership of a country can consciously turn to compromise or 
concessions to achieve defmite goals in the field of the national interest leaving intact basic 
requirements for national security. While assessing the national interest in international 
politics the art of a political decision-maker is to define what this interest is and to what 
extent it is flexible. 
Assessing the essence of the national interest, it is important to note that, inevitably, 
it is egoistic, as the interests of a nation are of prime importance. At the beginning of the 
20111 century, Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky said, "Maybe, I will face more sympathy if 
I say that in the area of the Middle East we have to be guided by healthy egoism ... "39 
[emphasis added] Similarly, in the debates in the Russian State Duma at that time its 
member Pavel Milyukov claimed, 
38 Wolfers., p. 44. 
39 Gosudarstvennaya Duma Sozyv 3. Sessiya 1. Stenographichesky Otschet ( S-Peterburg. 1908), p. 1786. 
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It is obvious that we cannot sacrifice our own interests to fulfill moral 
duties.40 
But any reasonable politician is forced to take into account the interests of other nations, 
though without sacrificing the paramount interests of his/her own in order to accommodate 
those of other nations. 
The formation of the national interest of a particular country is based not only on the 
assessment of its own interest but also on the assessment of the national interests of other 
countries. This assessment includes the objective aspect (geopolitical approach, power), but 
also the subjective, i.e. the decision-making process and the pursued policy. 
The graphic below depicts the formation of the national interest in a two-state 
system. A and B represent the states with their objective and subjective aspects of the 
national interest. Being under influence of the national interest of the state A the subjective 
aspect of state B undergoes some changes. It is necessary to emphasize that this is a two-
way process. 
Figure 2. Formation ofthe National Interest in a Two-state System 
40 Ibid., p. 1776. 
17 
H. THE ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
In order to examine the national interest it is useful to apply such variables offered 
by Joseph Frankel as images, motivations and values. 
1. Images 
For the purpose of the analysis it is advisable to focus on political decision-makers' 
and scholars' assessments of the national interest as they are supposed to define it. Images 
are personified reflections of the international environment in the mind. In international 
relations Frankel highlights uncertainties affecting the formation of the images of the 
national interest. 
1. Vagueness of the aspirations and lack of clear priorities; 
2. Incomplete knowledge of the international environment; 
3. Uncertainties about the behavior of other states and the evolution of the 
international system.41 
Both decision-makers and scholars may have different pictures of what national 
interests are like. Besides the above-mentioned uncertainties, differences in the assessments 
can be explained by the differences in experience and the availability of adequate 
information on the subject. 
However, people often have to act when there is a deficit of reliable information or 
they have to work when they have to select a small fraction of available information out of 
huge quantity of it. Thus, an important condition is a capability to make rational and precise 
decisions under the conditions of limited or surplus information. This requires exceptional 
analytical capabilities. 
Frankel derived his theory from the Gestal school of psychology. According to this 
school, a person tends to accept evidence corresponding to his adopted pattern and tends to 
reject those which run counter to his perception of reality. As history testifies, it can lead to 
41 Frankel, pp. 18-19. 
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disasters in decision-making. A vivid illustration of this is Stalin's disbelief in the 
possibility of the Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. Thus, one more significant 
condition is the capability of a person to obtain minimal bias to reality. If there is a critical 
mass of the opposite evidence one should not remain a slave of one's previous approach. 
That in its turn requires certain flexibility in the assessment. On the whole, the perception of 
the image is like the horizon: the closer you move toward it the farther it is. The task is to 
grasp the least distorted image by objective and subjective variables. 
Why do decision-makers make one decision or another? It is puzzling to note that 
on some occasions politicians behave very differently when they have roughly the same 
images of their national interests. To solve this puzzle it is necessary to examine 
motivations. 
2. ~otivations 
Wolfers stressed the importance ofunderstanding motivations: 
As soon as one seeks to discover the place of goals in the means-ends 
chain of relationships, almost inevitably one is led to probe into the dark 
labyrinth of human motives, those internal springs of conscious and 
subconscious action which Morgenthau calls 'the most illusive of 
psychological data.' Yet if one fails to inquire why actors choose their goals, 
one is forced to operate in an atmosphere of such abstraction that nothing 
revealed but the barest skeleton of the real world of international politics. 42 
Policy-makers have their own internal motivations which make their contribution to 
the formulation of the national interest. Among those there is psychological comfort, desire 
for power and fame, egoism, and self-realization. Motivations often become some sort of 
driving force in this formulation. 
There is another source of motivation coming from outside. A good example of it is 
a comparison of policy-makers and academic activity in defining the national interests. 
Policy-makers have to think about public opinion and the victory at the next elections. 
Inevitably, it affects their views of what constitutes the national interest. In this context the 
42 Wolfers, p. 70. 
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national interest can often be considered as a political action. Morgenthau shared his 
memories of this: 
I remember the statement I once heard a former Secretary of State make 
to the effect that he had always regarded it as his function to give the 
President advice on the basis of what he thought the principles of a sound 
American foreign policy required, leaving it to the President to decide how 
much of those sound principles could be safely put into practice in view of 
the state of domestic public opinion and the pressures of domestic politics. 
Thus, the actual foreign policies pursued by a government staffed even by 
theoreticians are bound to fall short, from time to time, of the requirements 
of a pure theoretical understanding of what American foreign policy ought 
to be. It is here that the theoretician of foreign policy must perform the 
function of an intellectual conscience which reminds the policy makers as 
well as the public at large of what the sound principles of foreign policy are 
and in what respects and to what extent actual policies have fallen short of 
those principles.43 
This quotation is a good example of the combination of the two motives. The first 
one is an advice of staff. The second one is an outside pressure from public or interest 
groups. Frankel suggested that there can be a discrepancy between personal and national 
motivation in national interests. "The parallel between national values, goals and interests 
and those ofthe individual is not complete and the dangers of pushing it too far are obvious. 
The tendency to personalize the state and to compare its goals and needs with those of the 
individuals, if pushing too far, inevitably leads to con:fusion."44 
However, some motivations cannot be understood rationally. Probably they are 
rooted at the subconscious level. For instance, it is impossible to explain logically why 
Stalin needed to exterminate the majority of Soviet high-ranking military on the eve of the 
World War II when Hitler's intentions were an open secret. 
43 Hans Morgenthau, Truth and Power, p. 259. 
44 Frankel, p. 115. 
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3. Values 
According to the definition of values put forward by Professor Easton, they "can be 
ultimately reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual's total life-
experiences.'>45 Frankel drew a distinction between aspirational and actual levels of values. 
In his opinion, "We can distinguish between aspirational values which combine into a 
vision of the good life, meaning the state of affairs which a person would find most 
desirable, and operational objectives (goals, ends) for which he has to find means and to 
which he applies his principles of behavior; these combine into policies or programs."
46 
Frankel also noted that in real life foreign policy is based on ideology and self-interest at the 
same time. To his mind, ideology as a value system is a synthesis of aspirational and actual 
policy. In international politics he draws a parallel between the idealist approach expressed 
by President Wilson and realist one expressed by his successors. In real life foreign policy is 
driven by both ideology and national interests. It is necessary to stress that too one-sided an 
approach is potentially dangerous for a nation. For example, according to Frankel the 
foreign policy of the Soviet Union was based on the combination of national interests, 
ideology and political power. The proclaimed dominance of ideology in the policy 
expressed in the Marxist postulate of proletarian internationalism led to enormous military 
and economic aid to allegedly socialist -oriented developing countries. At the same time 
competing with the United States, the Soviet Union tried to ensure its national interests and 
to enhance its political power in these countries by deploying military personnel, hardware 
and building military installations. Such foreign policy dominated by ideology resulted in a 
disastrous waste of material resources and was one of the reasons for economic collapse of 
the country. 
At the decision-making level of analysis it is important to know the system of 
beliefs of the decision-making group or an individual decision-maker. It is indispensable to 
45 David Easter, The Political System, 1953. p. 221, cited in Frankel p. 116. 
46 Frankel, p. 116. 
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be aware of this because different systems of beliefs can result in different visions of the 
national interest and different ways to achieve it. For example, religious fanatics or those 
who are ready for martyrdom will stop at next to nothing to reach their goals. They may 
sacrifice their own lives along with the lives of thousands of their compatriots, let alone 
"enemies." 
I. THE SYSTEM DIMENSION 
The formation of the national interest of a single state takes place not only on the 
basis of its interest in the objective and subjective aspects, but in the process of estimation 
and comparison of national interests of more than two subjects of international relations in a 
geopolitical system in the process of coinciding and clashing national interests of all the 
subjects of international relations involved. This comparison comprises, on the one hand, 
the geopolitical position of the subjects-i.e., the objective aspect-and on the other hand, 
the extent of the perception of the objective aspect and the policy pursued by them-i.e., the 
subjective aspect. The analysis of such a system approach can be presented in the following 





Figure 3. Objects of Action on X 
According to this scheme A trying to implement its interest in relation to X has to 
take into account the following variables: 
1. Potential of A to do this; 
2. Forecasted reaction ofB, C and D to the action of A; 
3. Possible reaction and internal evolution of X under the effect of A, B, C and D. 
These variables should be taken into account at the stage of the planning and 
forecast as well as to be corrected during realization. 
At the beginning of the 20th century according to the member of the Russian State 
Duma (Parliament) Milukov, in the Far East Russian national interests were being formed 
along the following lines, "The territorial enlargement of Russia could only be restricted by 
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1) the strength of Russia, 2) the parallel interests of England and Japan, 3) the future 
evolution of China."47 
In the present world of growing interdependence and the "threat of nuclear 
elimination, compatibility of national interests becomes a condition of human existence. 
Morgenthau noted, "A nation that seeks to pursue an intelligent and peaceful foreign policy 
cannot cease to comparing its own objectives and the objectives of other nations in the light 
of their compatibility .'>48 So, besides the interests of nations A and B, it is necessary to 
stress the interest of a system, whose existence becomes indispensable for all nations' 
existence. A nation which stays away from the use of military means to achieve its national 
interest is interested in avoiding forceful clashes. 
This leads to a conclusion that there is an interest of a system of nations. This 
system is an evolving structure with a harmonization of the interests of all the actors within 
it, creating a form of system stability. But as there is no absolute stability it is more precise 
to call it "dynamic stability." 
A 




47 Gosudarstvennaya Duma. Sozyv 3. Sessiya 4. Stenographichesky Otschet, Part 2 (S-Peterburg. 1911), p. 3456. 
48 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power, p. 518. 
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J. CLASSIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
This chapter will focus on the classification of the national interest. Some scholars 
consider that it is next to impossible to classify something so abstract, vague, subjective and 
at the same time objective. They think that, firstly, any classification tends to simplify the 
notion ofthe national interest and cannot present all the peculiarities of it, and secondly, that 
a real international environment is so complex that the frames of the classification tend to 
be too narrow. Undoubtedly, these judgments all have grounds. Nevertheless, commenting 
on such assumptions Frankel points out: 
Real life does not readily yield to the logic of these clear-cut distinctions 
or to any other ones. While it is a mistake to try to force reality into strait-
jacket of a conceptual scheme, each scheme can be helpful in the sorting out 
of some ambiguities and uncertainties of a specific situation; in fact, several 
schemes can be used simultaneously, provided their limited role is fully 
appreciated. 49 
In order to evade the drawbacks described by the proponents of the classification of 
the national interest it is advisable to classify the notion applying two classification 
approaches offered by Joseph Frankel and Donald Nuechterlein. 
1. Frankel's Approach 
According to Frankel the term national interest can be classified at aspirational, 
operational, explanatory and polemical levels. 
a. Aspirational Level of the National Interest 
In theoretical phonetics there is such a term as phonema. This is a "pure 
sound" which does not exist in reality. Foreign language learners imitate foreign language 
sounds trying to achieve its purity, namely, to achieve ideal sound or phonema. What even 
native speakers pronounce is a sound distorted by them. For example, different people will 
pronounce sound A differently, though it still will be sound A, not B. 
49 Frankel, p. 53. 
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To a great extent, the notion of the aspirational national interest has a lot in 
common with the notion of the phonema. This interest is connected with an image of the 
international environment that is favorable for a nation. It is a set of desifed ideals which, in 
fact, may not exist in real life or is impossible to achieve. The value of this interest is that it 
gives some sort of major directions for foreign policy. An example of aspirational interest 
can be a seen in the US Government's "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement" where the author's desire "to shape a world conducive to U.S. interests and 
consistent with American values ... "50 
Frankel gives the following description of the aspirational national interest: 
1. They are normally long-term interests; 
2. They are generally rooted in history and/or ideology; 
3. They command more attention from an opposition free of the restraints of, and 
the preoccupation with, the tasks of governing than from the actual government; 
4. Even when they do not directly influence actual policy, they can provide 
purpose or direction, or at the least, a sense of hope; 
5. They need not be fully articulated and co-ordinated and they can be 
contradictory; 
6. They do not require a "feasibility study" and are rarely if ever costed; 
7. They are determined by political will rather than by capabilities-ideology is a 
strong determinant. 51 
b. Operational Level of the National Interest 
Unlike aspirational national interests, operational national interests are the 
subject of real policy and are really pursued. They have the following properties: 
50 A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. (The White House, 1996), p. 9. 
51 Frankel, p. 32. 
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1. They are usually short-term interests, capable of achievement within the 
foreseeable future; 
2. They often, but not exclusively, stem from considerations, of expediency or 
necessity; 
3. They are the predominant concern of the government and /or party in power; 
4. They are used in a descriptive rather than a normative form; 
5. Owing to the practical problems of implementation, contradictions among them 
are less easily tolerated than among aspirations; 
6. They are generally translated into politics which are based upon the assessment 
of their prospects of success and which can be at least approximately costed; 
7. The crucial variable in their determination is found in capabilities rather than in 
political will. Hence the hypothesis can be advanced that classification of states 
by power is here more relevant than that by ideology. It is likely that all small 
states, whatever their ideology, merely react to overwhelming international 
stimuli; with them policy is distinct from positive purpose; 
8. They can be systematically arranged into maximum and minimum programs, 
the former approximating aspirational interests. Such arrangement, however, 
depends upon systematic planning of foreign policy and rarely, if ever, actually 
takes place; only Soviet foreign policy in some of its aspects can be regarded as 
a reasonable example. 52 
Frankel notes that if aspirational interests remained unchallenged for a long 
time they may lose their value and become a tradition or vanish in the long run. To illustrate 
this it is useful to look at the idea of mission in Russian foreign policy in the Balkan region. 
While it was one of determinants of that policy in the 19th century, it was on the wane 
during the 20th century and today it became more of a tradition. On the other hand, if 
operational interests remain unchallenged they may move to the category of aspirational 
ones or vanish completely. 
52 Frankel, p. 32-33. 
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Another peculiarity is a contradiction between policies aimed at achieving 
these two levels of interests and decision-makers pursuing these policies. Frankel has in 
mind key political decision-makers who work out conceptions and those who implement 
these conceptions. When it comes to interests the former think deductively and tend to 
disregard costs or the process of fulfillment. They state what should be done. The later work 
on the operational interests inductively and take care of benefits and costs and the 
fulfillment of the task. They try to fulfill this ideal task under the conditions of controversial 
reality preserving the task's original essence and preventing its distortion. An example of 
another contradiction is between the US 's aspirational interests to promote democracy 
around the world and its actual policy. US policy in relation to some Arab countries in the 
Gulf has nothing to do with aspirational interests, but solely operational ones, and is aimed 
at achieving the US national interests in a region considered vital by the United States. 
c. Explanatory and Polemical Levels of National Interests 
Frankel admits that these two levels have much in common and that is 
advisable to unite them for consideration. They are connected with the assessment and 
critique of foreign policy. As Frankel writes, "Its main role is to 'prove' oneself right and 
one's opponents wrong and the arguments are used for this purpose rather than for 
describing or prescribing. "53 
2. Nuechterlein's Approach 
Donald Nuechterlein offers a classification of US national interests based on the 
system categories and intensity of the interests which, with certain reservations, have a 
universal character. 
53 
In Nuechterlein's opinion US national interests can be divided into: 
1. Defense of Homeland: Protection of the people, territory, and institutions of the 
United States against potential foreign dangers. This is usually referred to as the 
national defense interest... 
Frankel, p. 35. 
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2. Economic Well-being: Promotion of U.S. international trade and investment, 
including protection of private interests in foreign countries. This may be called 
the national economic interest. 
3. Favorable World Order (international security): Establishment of a peaceful 
international environment in which disputes between nations can be resolved 
without resort to war and in which collective security rather than unilateral 
action is employed to deter or to cope with aggression. This is also referred to as 
the international security interest... 
4. Promotion of Values (ideology): Promulgation of a set of values that the U.S. 
leaders believe to be universally good and worthy of emulation by other 
countries. 54 
This classification can be useful in examining national interests of any country with 
the exception of the "promotion of values" category. Instead of this category it would be 
more advisable to use the one of"international prestige." 
Another approach to classification is connected with evaluation of the intensity of 
the challenged interest. Nuechterlein maintains, "It is the intensity of concern about any 
basic interest at a given period of time that forms the basis of policy-making in foreign 
affairs. These intensities, or degrees of interest, constitute a different category that we will 
call 'transitory,' because they are subject to change depending on the government's 
perception of their urgency at any given time. "55 The term "transitory" means that all 
interests are taken into account and are evaluated but that various categories may be 
challenged to a different extent and, consequently, require different degrees of attention 
from the policy-makers. 
54 
55 
Nuechterlein offers the following four-tiered scale of priorities: 
(1) survival interests, where the very existence of the nation is in peril; 
(2) vital interests, where probable serious harm to the security and well-
being of the nation will result if strong measures, including military ones, 
Donald E. Nuechterlein, America Overcommited United States National Interests in the 1980s (The University 
Press ofKentucky, 1985), p. 8. 
Nuechterlein, p. 9. 
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are not taken by the government within a short period of time; (3) major 
interests, where potential serious harm could come to the nation if no action 
is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad; ( 4) peripheral (minor) 
interests, where little if any harm to the entire nation will result if "wait and 
see" policy is adopted. 56 
Nuechterlein indicates the importance of the time dimension as a measurement of 
the interests. He notes, "Another way to measure the intensity of an interest is to use a time 
dimension: survival interests require the immediate attention of the President; vital interests 
require urgent planning in the executive branch; major interests require serious study; and 
peripheral ones suggest 'watchful waiting. "'57 If we take the time dimension as an 
independent variable and the categories of interests as dependent ones the correlation 
between them will appear in the following way: 
A 
0 
56 Ibid., p. 9-10. 
57 Ibid., p. 10. 




P - Peripheral 
Figure 5. Time Dimension and Categories of Interests 
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Explaining the scale of priorities Nuechterlein observes, "A survival interest exists 
when there is an imminent, credible threat of massive destruction to the homeland if another 
state's demands are not quickly met. Such crises are easy to detect because they are 
dramatic and involve an armed attack, or threat of attack, by one country on another's 
territory."58 An example of a survival interest being at stake is the attack of the fascist 
Germany on the Soviet Union in 1941 or the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. 
According to Nuechterlein, "A vital interest differs from a survival one principally 
in the amount of time that a country has to decide how it will respond to an external threat. 
Vital interests involve economic, world-order, and ideological issues as well as defense of 
the homeland ones and may ultimately be as crucial to a country as direct threats to its 
independence. It is important to emphasize that a vital interest is not defined by the kind of 
policy actions a president takes in a crisis or serious international dispute; the actions are 
only symptomatic of the intensity of the interest. "59 An example of this category of interests 
being challenged is an attack on international oil resources. 
Nuechterlein continues, "A major interest is one that a country considers to be 
important but not crucial to its well-being. These are issues or trends that can be negotiated 
with an adversary-whether they are economic, political, or ideological. Policy-makers 
usually come to the conclusion that negotiation and compromise, rather than confrontation, 
are desirable--even though the results can be painful."
60 An example of American major 
interest being challenged is the Arab oil embargo of 1973. 
According to Nuechterlein, "A peripheral interest is one which does not seriously 
affect the well-being of the United States as a whole, even though it may be detrimental to 
the private interests of Americans conducting business abroad. These are issues that bear 
watching by the State Department and other government agencies, but they are a lower 
58 Nuechterlein, p. 10. 
59 Ibid., p. 11. 
60 Ibid., p. 12. 
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order of political, economic, or ideological magnitude."61 An example of an American 
peripheral interest being challenged is the change of the government in Turkey. 
3. The National Interest Matrix 
Nuechterlein offers the national interest matrix as a conceptual framework to 
evaluate national interests. The vertical column is basic national interests while the 
horizontal row comprises four intensities of interest. Having changed the "promotion of 
values" category for "international prestige", "favorable world order" for "favorable 
international environment" and "defense of homeland" for "military security" the matrix 
will look as follows: 
Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Military Security 
Economic Well-being 
Favorable International Environment 
International Prestige 
Nuechterlein emphasizes that the policy-makers' task is defined by the extent to 
which a political or a military issue challenges different categories of national interests. As 
he writes: "Then he [the policy-maker] should estimate the intensity of interest that other 
countries have in the same issue, for each basic interest. Comparing the levels of interest at 
stake for the principal countries involved, a calculation can be made as to whether the issue 
is likely to be negotiable or whether it will probably lead to an armed confrontation."62 
Using this matrix it is possible to measure the national interests of some participants 
in the Gulf war, namely, Kuwait, Iraq, the U.S. and Great Britain, as these interests were 
perceived by them. 
61 Ibid., p. 13. 
62 Ibid., p. 14. 
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Basic Interest at Stake Intensity of Interest· 
Survival Vital Major Peripheral 
Military Security Kuwait Iraq USA 
Britain 
Economic Well-being Kuwait Iraq Britain 
USA 
Favorable International Environment Kuwait Iraq Britain 
\ 
USA 
International Prestige Kuwait Iraq Britain 
USA 
a Military Security 
According to this chart, all cmmtries considered their military security to 
challenged but to a different extent. Only Kuwait, which fell victim of Iraq's aggression and 
whose territory was occupied, regarded this interest as survival. Military security for Iraq 
was vital because of the huge amount of allied forces involved into the operation, capable of 
penetrating into Iraq's territory. If these forces had advanced farther and the threat to 
Saddam Hussein's regime had become imminent, the vital interest at stake could have 
turned into a survival one. Due to the large distance between Iraq, on the one hand, and the 
U.S. and Great Britain, on the other, their military security was peripheral. That is why the 
preparation for the operation took as much time as it did as it was necessary for allied forces 
to concentrate troops and to mislead Hussein about their intentions. 
b. Economic Well-being 
The intensity of economic well-being was survival for Kuwait for the same 
reasons as for its military security. Iraq had vital economic interests at stake because it 
hoped to receive extra material resources and claimed to possess Kuwait's rich oil reserves. 
The US had a vital economic interest in the region because of oil. Britain considered its 
economic interest as major because traditionally Britain has been interested in having an 
economic presence in the Middle East. 
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c. Favorable International Environment 
The intensity of such an interest as favorable international environment was 
at the level of survival for Kuwait because only by relying on its allies could Kuwait exist 
as an independent state. Iraq regarded the importance of a favorable international 
environment as vital because it could split Arab countries from the US and form the 
environment that was appropriate to attain its goals. The US concluded that a favorable 
international environment was vital because the strengthening of Saddam Hussein's regime 
could, firstly, break the existing system of states pursuing the policy consistent with 
America's basic values, and secondly, endanger a US strategic ally, as Israel and Arab 
countries loyal to the US. The intensity of this interest for Britain was major. Britain had the 
same interest as the US in the region, but due to less extensive British involvement in 
comparison with that of America the interest was major. 
d. International Prestige 
The intensity of this interest for Kuwait was survival. The existence of the 
country was at stake so the failure to survive as a state was equal to the complete loss of 
prestige. Iraq concluded that it had a vital interest. Iraq was aimed at demonstrating that 
despite economic sanctions it was still powerful and capable of its own resisting allied 
forces. So it hoped that this small victorious war would increase its prestige abroad. The US 
also had a vital interest in the category of international prestige. Saddam Hussein's victory 
would be a heavy blow for democracy and the prestige of the US as its guarantor. Besides, 
Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was a good test to demonstrate US military and political 
capabilities in defending its allies. Britain followed the way paved by the US, but because 
of a smaller British involvement and a more limited role played by Britain in the region the 
intensity of the interest was major. 
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Ill. AMERICAN VIEWS OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS IN NATO 
ENLARGEMENT 
A. GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES IN EUROPE 
According to the most recent official statement of the US national security policy, 
"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:" 
The primary security imperative of the past half century-containing 
communist expansion while preventing nuclear war--was gone. Instead, we 
confronted a complex array of new and old security challenges ... 
63 
The disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to a 
new geopolitical situation. According to political scientist Kenneth Waltz the rigid bilateral 
European system and the presence of nuclear weapons (the hypothesis offered by John 
Gaddis in the journal International Security, Spring 1986, Vol. 10, No.4) resulted in a more 
or less stable peace in Europe. 
The Cold War was a long and at some points dangerous confrontation between the 
West and the East. However, primarily it was a competition where both sides tried to abide 
by both signed agreements and unwritten laws. Both sides played by fixed rules and did not 
interfere in each other's established spheres of interests. More or less stable and predictable 
confrontation was a peculiarity of that period. Nowadays the situation is different. 
Today, Europe is best seen as standing at a crossroads: capable of moving 
towards either peaceful stability or chronic tunnoil. As of 1993, Europe was 
divided into three separate parts that were not interacting a great deal: an 
inward-looking Western community, a neutral East Central Europe, and an 
internally consumed Russia.64 
There are two opposite assessments of the geopolitical development in Europe. The 
first one maintains that Europe has good prospects for peaceful development. This is the 
63 
"A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement" (The White House 1996), p. 1. 
64 Richard Kugler with Marianna Kozintseva, Enlarging NATO. The Russia Factor (RAND, 1996), pp.12-13. 
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foundation of the view of those who believe that the very notion of war in Europe is 
obsolete. 
The idea that Europe may be vulnerable to sliding into another era of 
fragile geopolitics will be dismissed by optimists who judge that the current 
era has made history anachronistic. They argue that the combination of 
democracy, market economics, communications, technology, multilateral 
institutions, learned lessons, new attitudes, and other developments may be 
transforming international politics for the good.65 
On the other hand, according to another approach the present transitional period in · 
Eastern Europe is turbulent and requires balanced political and military steps based on the 
calculation of costs and benefits. "The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over."66 This 
situation may turn out to be more fragile in terms of the possibility of ethnic conflicts and 
local wars than the previous bilateral system. 
Yet, ethnic hatred and romantic nationalism have produced rampant 
slaughter in the Balkans, suggesting that even if history is not springing back 
to life, it is definitely not yet dead.67 
Former National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger emphasized the peculiarity of 
the present geopolitical situation in Europe in the following way: 
Well, it is a different situation than it was during the Cold War. In the 
Cold War we could size our military forces in relation to specific threats. In 
the next period, we have to develop our military forces in .regard to potential 
situations that might arise, even though we cannot defme the individual 
threat precisely. And we do not have the advantage of a yardstick in which 
we simply measure how much the Soviet Union has. We have to think of 
potential situations of instability ... 68 
There is a view that an unstable situation in Eastern Europe may lead to some sort 
of anarchy. As scholar Richard Kugler argued: 
65 Kugler, p. 16. 
66 
"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" (The White House, 1996), p. 35. 
67 Ibid., p.16. 
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... means a lack of central government or ordering principles to govern 
fundamental political relations. It especially means a lack of guaranteed 
security arrangements and assurances about the future. Anarchy can magnify 
already-existing conflicts. Moreover, anarchy can create a .,climate of 
uncertainty about the future ... 69 
An expert on NATO retired General William Odom, Director of the National 
Security Studies, at the Hudson Institute indicated more directly the location of potential 
danger: 
Instability, civil violence, and dictatorship in the eastern part of Europe 
cannot but adversely affect the politics and economics of Western Europe. 
That means our interests in Europe are seriously threatened by the 
conditions and domestic developments in the former Warsaw Pact states.
70 
The present geopolitical landscape does not just represent NATO, Russia and the 
buffer zone between them including all countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Republics. General Odom believes: 
Without NATO, or with NATO and outside it, Russia will probably 
succeed in setting most of the rest of Europe against Germany. Their 
[Russian officials] big challenge in the decades ahead is the struggle with 
Germany over Central Europe.71 






We have an interest in establishing a security framework in the region 
between Russia and Germany that threatens no one while it reassures all 
interested parties, both large and small, that there is no opportunity for 
competing powers to contest one another.72 
Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, 1995), p. 9. 
Kugler, p. 163. 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, 1995), p. 29. 
Ibid., p. 28. 
Ibid., p. 7. 
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The security uncertainty of the position of countries in this zone and the fear of a 
Russian-German rivalry in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russian dominance in the 
former Soviet Republics explains the vector of NATO policy. Kissinger believes that the 
aim of the NATO strategy is how to bring together: 
... two conflicting considerations: the fear of alienating Russia against the 
danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between Germany and 
Russia.73 
B. THENEWNATO 
According to the American view, NATO has to preserve its old task of collective 
defense. But under new geopolitical conditions in order to survive NATO also has to 
perform other tasks. 
The first one is to contain instability. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement 
and Enlargement" maintains that, "Enlarging the Alliance will promote our interests by 
reducing the risk of instability or conflict in Europe's eastern half ... "74 
The second task is to widen the security zone through NATO enlargement. 
NATO enlargement will not be aimed at replacing one division of Europe 
with a new one; its purpose is to enhance the security of all European states, 
members and nonmembers alike. 75 
The third task is not adopted in open US official documents but it can be described 
by Kissinger's appropriate warning, "You don't buy an insurance policy after the fire 






The Russian obsession with big-power status, the growing desire to 
reconstitute a block of at least satellite states within the territory of the 
Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," Washington Post (19 December 1994), p. A27. 
"A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," p. 38. 
Ibid., p. 38. 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 63. 
38 
former Soviet Union, and the effort to limit the sovereignty of the Central 
European states could produce a crisis with the West. In such case, an 
enlarged NATO would have no choice but to become again a defensive 
alliance against an external threat. 77 
According to this task the alliance is aimed at a neocontainment of Russia. 
The fourth task is closely connected with the above-mentioned ones and is based on 
the notion of "democratic peace," which asserts that democracies do not fight each other. 
This task is to promote and strengthen democracy in the eastern part of Europe. 
Final imperative of this new strategy is to support the growth of 
democracy and individual freedoms that has begun in Russia, the nations of 
the former Soviet Union and Europe's former communist states.
78 
The fifth task is to play the role of deterrence against anything that cannot be 
precisely assessed but can be perceived as a threat to NATO. At the debates in the US 
Congress, Under Secretary of Defense Frank Wisner noted, "The key way to deter danger to 
the United States is to maintain presence, to maintain the deployment of forces to sustain 
our alliances precisely to discourage the emergence of a threat."
79 
These new tasks of NATO are based on new approaches: 
To solve the problem of instability through "out of area operations." For the first time in its 
history NATO intends to conduct operations when none of the NATO members are 
attacked by an enemy. This function is extremely important for NATO. "As US Senator 
Lugar warned, NATO risks going 'out of business' if it does not go 'out of area.' "
80 
Inevitably, all European countries of the CIS including Russia, being in the process of 
transition, fall into the category of unstable countries, thus they become the region of close 
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To enlarge NATO. NATO enlargement achieves the role of the above--mentioned 
objectives and is a tool to achieve them at the same time. NATO peace-keeping and peace-
enforcing operations. 
C. THE CONCEPT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND NATO 
ENLARGEMENT 
In the post-Cold War period to a great extent the perception of threat became 
ambiguous and obscure. That complicated "the reading" of the situation and the definition 
of national interest priorities. Wisner declared: 
It is easier to analyze a situation where you know you have a monolithic 
threat and you are organized to defend against it. Now, we have this highly 
diversified, multifaceted, messy set of instabilities that can come and really 
affect our national interests and our national security.81 
Another problem is connected with the multiplicity of issues NATO enlargement is 
intended to address. "The West will be pursuing multiple objectives, not all of which are 
readily achievable or automatically compatible."82 On top of that, as Stephen Cimbala 
states, "Eastward enlargement further complicates an already overburdened policy 
agenda. "83 
Another peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is the return of the 
significance ofthe notion ofthe national interest. Since the end of ideological confrontation, 
at least, leading European powers tend to pursue their policy under growing 
interdependency but without losing sight of their national interests. According to 
Thucydides a common enemy makes alliances. The commonly perceived Soviet threat 
united NATO members and strengthened the alliance. Now it is no longer present case. 
81 
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Great uncertainty about where international politics is headed creates 
powerful incentives for many countries to fall back on national interests as a 
determinant of foreign policy. This trend is already noticeable even within 
the western community. The national interest provides a criterion for 
shaping diplomacy toward many age-old strategic dilemmas that are 
resurfacing. 84 
The trend to more independent national decision-making aimed at pursuing national 
interests was confirmed at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in June 1996. 
French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette commented at the meeting: 
France is satisfied because for the first time in alliance history, Europe 
will really be able to express its personality ... 85 
What implications does this trend have for NATO and NATO enlargement in 
particular? 
It has been argued that should NATO grow its cohesion and sense of 
common purpose inevitably will dissipate; that a larger NATO, exacerbated 
by significant cultural and geopolitical differences, will become 
unmanageable; and that reaching agreement between new and old members 
on important issues will prove difficult."86 
Going back to the purpose of NATO and its enlargement, it is obvious that to 





Without a common enemy to unite us, we may find that our conceptions 
of what constitutes national interest may very well divide us, 
87 stressed 
Senator Biden. 
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In an emerging multipolar world diverging national interests of different countries 
may not be compatible and cannot always be easily accommodated to each other. The 
former US Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted: 
With the disappearance of the Soviet threat it would be quixotic to expect 
the alliance to display the same degree of cohesion or unity now as it did 
when the members felt directly threatened. Inevitably, differences will 
develop and may be strongly expressed. Open quarrels may occur.88 
An attempt to solve the problem of instability in Central and Eastern Europe by 
NATO enlargement may affect different categories of national interest of different 
countries. For example, an issue can fall into the category of major national interest for 
Germany, but a peripheral one for Britain, giving rise to a dispute between them. The 
problem will be more complicated to resolve if a larger number of countries have 
contradictions or some countries like Turkey and Greece take opposite positions. Even such 
"preparatory course" for NATO admission as Partnership for Peace Program may not iron 
out all the differences. During the discussions on NATO Senator Lugar noted, 
Partnership for Peace is an attempt at an amalgam of the Administration's policies towards 
NATO, toward Central Europe, and toward Russia. It reflects of necessity the lowest 
common denominator and contains some inherent contradictions. It seeks to accommodate 
a variety of interests and, in the process, satisfies none, least of all American interests. 
Moreover, precisely because American and European interests with respect to Central 
Europe and Russia are not necessarily synonymous, the attempt to utilize the Partnership for 
Peace as the primary multilateral alliance vehicle to accommodate conflicting policies both 
within and among key Western allies toward the East can be nothing more than a stopgap 
measure and will likely spin off more parochial variations over time. 89 
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D. THE AREA OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
It is useful to examine what American images of Russian national interests there are 
in relation to NATO enlargement. This examination is significant for tWo reasons: first, it 
indicates that the notion of the national interest is not obsolete and is still important in 
foreign policy. Second, a better understanding of the diversity of approaches to the Russian 
national interests ensures better mutual understanding between NATO and the United 
States, on the one hand, and Russia on the other. 
For this purpose it is necessary to examine the views on the Russian national interest 
of both proponents and opponents of NATO enlargement. This examination will focus on 
the following variables: 
• Attitudes to NATO enlargement. 
• Theoretical foundations of the positions. 
• Russian national interest as threat assessment. 
• The sphere of the Russian national interests. 
• The accoln.modation of the interests of NATO and Russia through 
institutionalization of their relations. 
There are two different rationales for what Russian national interests are and why 
enlargement should be pursued, as will be discussed below in terms of firm maximalists and 
flexible maximalists. Also another rational for what Russian national interests are and why 
NATO enlargement should not occur will be discussed in terms of minimalists. After these 
theoretical constructs are created and examined the following hypothesis connected with the 
US official position on these issues will be tested. 
• HYPOTHESIS 1. The US official position fits any of the above-mentioned 
positions. 
• HYPOTHESIS 2. The US official position does not fit any of the above-
mentioned positions and is unique in its character. 
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E. THE POSITION OF FIRM MAXIMALISTS 
The representatives of this group believe that the enlargement is· indispensable and 
urgent. 
1. Theoretical Foundation 
The theoretical foundation of the firm maximalists' position is based on the 
following variables. 
The first variable is connected with the determinants of foreign policy. The 
proponents of this position consider that Soviet foreign policy was determined by 
ideological and geopolitical factors. After the end of the Cold War Russian foreign policy 
has undergone substantial conceptual changes. The firm maximalists maintain that the 
ideological factor as determinant of the present Russian foreign policy is gone. However, 
Russia is returning to its pre revolutionary of 1917 geopolitical and the national interest 
determinants of its foreign policy. Brzezinski emphasized: 
Prevailing Russian thinking about central Europe is an extension of this 
proto-imperial approach.90 
Kissinger was more specific, saying that one of these factors is expansionism. He stressed: 
Yet creeping expansionism has been the recurring theme of Russian 
history. For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its 
own population to this outward thrust and threatened all its population with 
it. In the Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice have been transmuted into 
a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service of an alleged 
Russian superior morality.91 
He also spoke about two schools of thought noting: 
90 
91 
One is that we should try to concentrate on shaping Russian domestic 
institutions and supporting particular leaders. There is another school of 
thought to which I belong that holds we are likely to be most effective by 
trying to affect Russian foreign policy. We dealt with in the Cold War both 
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communism and imperialism, and while communism has been defeated, the 
trend toward imperialism still exists.92 
At the debates in the US Congress, speaking about diversity of opinions Arnold 
Horelick of RAND highlighted one of the them: 
A geopolitical orientated view that holds Russia, on virtually existential 
grounds, is simply fated to remain an outside power; not capable of being 
assimilated by the West; driven by its history, geography, and traditions to 
be an expansionist force in world politics; and extremely unlikely to 
overcome its deeply ingrained authoritarianism.93 
The second variable deals with the view of firm maximalists, who see Russia as a 
defeated enemy in the Cold War. But in Brzezinski's opinion being defeated did not much 
alter the mentality of Russian statesmen or Russian foreign policy. One of those features, as 
he indicated, is "great power mentality." Brzezinski noted, "Russia is a defeated power. 
After 70 years of communism she lost a titanic struggle. To say 'it was not Russia but the 
Soviet Union' means to escape from reality. It was Russia in the name of the Soviet Union. 
She challenged the United States. It lost. Now it has a chance to become a mature, 
democratic, European state through deep, responsible, and full reconstruction. But for this 
one should not have illusions that Russia is a great power. It is necessary to get rid of this 






enlargement is linked to U.S. support for Bosnian Muslims, as well as 
Ukraine. These moves have been seen as part of a larger strategic design to 
consolidate the geostrategic gains of the Cold War at Russia's expense.
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As a strategic illustration of such gains Brzezinski offered a new strategy. 
According to him: 
The central goal of a realistic and long-term grand strategy should be the 
consolidation of geopolitical pluralism within the former Soviet Union. That 
goal defines more appropriate the long-term American interest, irrespective 
of whether in the near future Russia does not become an accommodating 
democracy. 96 
In another interview Brzezinski described the situation in Russia: 
... as messy, as somewhat unstable, and as part and parcel of a long-term 
historical process that will not produce either stability or democracy in 
Russia on a firm, secure basis for some time to come. The loss of empire has 
further compounded the difficulties of the post-Communist transformation 
in Russia. Nonetheless, in the long run I am hopeful; but I don't have any 
naive expectations about the near future.97 
Brzezinski's controversial position indicates the controversy of the whole position 
of firm maximalists. Firstly, they do not believe the possibility of democratic development 
of Russia. Secondly, even if reforms pave the way to democracy their success is not likely 
to change the nature of Russia and will not mean a big shift in the US strategy towards 
Russia. In terms of geopolitical pluralism the most important issue for the United States is 
to prevent the formation on the territory of the former Soviet Union of a new state, 
democratic or not, whose power would be comparable with the United States. 
The third variable is connected with either historic rivalry or arrangements between 




Germany would have a tremendous temptation to enter into an 
arrangement with Russia and that Moscow would be certain to exploit it.98 
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In her opinion, today geopolitical situation in Europe resembles the one of 1938. 
Dobriansky stated: 
' 
Essentially they [Central European countries] feel like pawns in a 
complicated minuet between Russia and the West. As the Czechs used to 
say about Munich: "About us, without us." It is imperative that we avoid 
such negative historical parallelisms.99 
Such position indicates that some firm maximalists are suspicious about future German 
pattern of behavior and definitely distrust the one of Russia. They see the way out of this 
situation in the filling the so called security vacuum between Germany and Russia. 
According to the firm maximalists view, the best case scenario of Russian national 
interests in Europe are not compatible with America's and may cause friction. The worst 
case scenario, which is more likely, is that they will pose a danger. Firm maximalists focus 
on two key points. The fust one is a historic determinant, namely, expansionism. As Henry 
Kissinger maintained: 
If we seek genuine reforms in Russia, its leaders must be brought to 
understand that a return to historic drives will replicate the debacles of the 
past. NATO expansion requires a decision, not a study; its absence will 
tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers.
100 
The second one is a combination of historic and geopolitical considerations. It boils 
down to a historic rivalry between Germany and Russia which received impetus after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. As the former National Security Adviser 
Brzezinski puts it: 
... the right course is to insist firmly that the gradual expansion ofNATO 
eastward is not a matter of 'drawing a new line' ... but of avoiding a security 
vacuum between Russia and NATO ... 101 
In turn Kissinger holds: 
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This is even more true of NATO expansion--a subject on which 
administration ambivalence threatens to create a gray zone in Eastern 
Europe between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian 
drives to create political and strategic vacuums around its periphery. 102 
These considerations are based on the assumption that international politics is coming back 
to traditional politics but in another international environment. In this connection Robert 
Zoellick stated, "While the cold war is history, geopolitics is not at an end."103 In his 
opinion, the nature of the Russian foreign policy has not changed much. That is why taking 
advantage of the current geopolitical realities, the strategy of the West through NATO 
enlargement should be aimed at containment and deterrence of Russia by creating new 
security architecture. Zoellick underlined: 
For centuries, Russia has sought to dominate these countries. It might 
naturally seek to do so again if we do not establish a new system that 
becomes the basis for a new security perspective. After World War II, we 
prevented a return to centuries-old conflicts in Western Europe by creating a 
new diplomatic architecture. Now we must quiet old competitions in Eastern 
Europe by extending our architecture eastward.104 
These considerations require a strategy capable of both deterring and resisting all 
such trends. In general terms, this strategy can be called "neocontainment of Russia within 
her borders." More specifically, firm maximalists tend to adopt "The Strategy of 
Neocontainment with Mixed Power Projection and Forward Presence." This strategy 
implies: 
• Medium threat, medium warning time, forward defense not imperative 
• Low or no Allied presence on the territory of Eastern European countries in 
peacetime 
102 Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," p. 43. 
103 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 9. 
104 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Path 
• Requirement of the prepositioning of equipment with strong Allied mobility 
assets105 
The position of firm maximalists on path to NATO enlargement is the following:
106 
Rationale Assumption Timetable Criteria Who decides 
Project stability Provide political Security Fast track Political, NATO, East-
or security vacuum, strategic Central Europe 
anchor Russian 
expansionism 
Table 1. Max1malists Path to NATO Enlargement 
F. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Examining the Russian national interest in terms of the threat assessment to Western 
and Eastern Europe, firm maximalists indicate two factors. The first one is purely military 
and is in line with "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement." The 
Strategy highlights US intelligence priorities in relation to the most serious threats and 
focuses on "countries that possess strategic nuclear forces that can pose a threat to the 
United States and its allies."107 Being a nuclear power Russia falls into this category. The 
second factor is more diverse. At the Congressional Testimony, former Bush 
Administration official Robert Zoellick claimed: 
I tend to agree with General Odom that the nature of the threat does not 
have to be a formal military one; there are lots of things Russia can do 
separate from that. 108 
Admitting that there is no imminent threat from Russia, firm maximalists like Zoellick 
indicate that in case of failure to build ,strong democracy in Russia the leadership might 
promote its national interests bey~nd Russian borders, in order "to reassert Russian control 
105 Adapted from Ronald Asmus information. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, p. 57. 
106 Ibid., p. 55. 
107 
"A National Security Strategy ofEngagement and Enlargement," p. 24. 
108 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 37. 
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over Central Asia and the Transcaucasus and to make occasional menacing comments about 
Ukraine and the Baltic republics."109 As General Odom stressed, another: 
... aspect of the threat from Russia is troublemaking diplomacy. We 
already see signs of it. Russia has supported Serbia against Bosnia and 
Croatia, citing its longstanding ties to the Serbs as something that is natural 
and for us to accept as given and inexorable. As time passes and differences 
among West European states surface, Russian diplomacy will try to exploit 
them, making as much mischief as possible.110 
This attitude is the reaction to the more national interest-oriented, and less ideologically-
oriented, Russian foreign policy of today. Basically, the position of firm maximalists is 
rightly described by Anatol Lieven, who noted: 
All public discussions in Poland, and much of it in the United States, on 
the part of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, Robert Dole, and others, 
has been conducted in terms of the need to contain a presumed Russian 
threat and to prevent Russia from exerting influence on its neighbors--
influence that is automatically viewed as illegitimate and threatening to the 
West. 111 
G. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Firm maximalists oppose the idea of the division of Europe into spheres of interests 
among European powers in general and for Russia in particular. Analyzing the driving force 
of the position of the proponents for fast NATO enlargement George Moffett noted: 
The argument for rapid expansion is that it would quickly remove 
ambiguity about the future of central Europe, sending an unmistakable 
signal to Russia, while it is still weak, that the region is forever off limits. If 
NATO does not expand now, rapid expansionists insist, it will languish 
109 Ibid., p. 27. 
110 Ibid., p. 27. 
111 Anatol Lieven, "A New Iron Curtain; Implications ofNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization Eastward Expansion 
for Russia," The Atlantic Monthly, (January 1996). 
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because it will become irrelevant to the new security challenges that face 
Europe.112 
Zoellick stressed: 
We want to make clear to the Russians, as well as to the Eastern 
Europeans and the Germans, that these new democracies are also not in 
Russia's sphere of influence. 113 
As it was indicated above, the trend in Russian diplomatic activity to widen the area of the 
Russian national interest beyond its borders is regarded as menacing. Firm maximalists 
claim that NATO enlargement would prevent any repeat of the Yalta-like situation in the 
immediate post Cold War period. 
Since the end of the second World War, we insisted that Russia had no 
special rights in either Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, or any other 
Warsaw Pact nation. We also took the position that the Soviet Union had no 
right to incorporate the Baltic States into its own govemment.114 
Former US Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Max 
Kampelman emphasized. Today, according to this position, the most efficient way to stop 
the spread of the Russian national interests to Central and Eastern European countries is by 
NATO enlargement. Ambassador Kampelman maintained: 
What is the purpose of NATO? Is this forward deployment of force to 
stop the Soviet Union? The truth is, half the people writing Op-Ed pieces, 
who advocate early admission, not all but half, are suggesting it for one 
simple reason: It relates to Russia; nothing else. They think there is a 
possibility of an aggressive, Nationalist, imperialist Russian revival. 115 
112 George Moffett, "How Clinton Will Mollify Russians on NATO's Role," The Christian Science Monitor, May 
8, 1995. 
113 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 8. 
114 Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
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Senate, p. 78. 
115 Ibid., p. 109. 
51 
Another fear was expressed by a scholar Holger Mey, who asks: 
Would a 'democratic' Russia no longer have a national interest in the 
Baltic states? Would democracy prevent Russia from having a ~eostrategic 
interest in warm-water harbors in the Indian Ocean? Interests like those are 
not without legitimacy per se, but we don't know yet how Russia might 
pursue those interests and to what extent those interests are compatible with 
ours. 116 
The proponents of the firm maximalist position take a mixed and controversial view. On the 
one hand, when they speak about geopolitical determinism and foreign policy based on 
national interests they talk realpolitik. On the other hand, when they speak about a 
"democratic peace" their attitude is based on the ideas of international liberalism. They are 
interested in seeing Russia be a democratic country, but at the same time they do not believe 
that democracy will change the "imperial" character of Russian foreign policy and fear that 
Russia will follow the pattern of behavior typical for tsarist and Soviet period. For example, 
Brzezinski imagined Russian thinking in the following way: 
Central Europe is not to be permitted to become an organic part of an 
integrating Europe, and especially of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The region 
is explicitly designated as an area of special Russian interest and influence, 
including--to the new military doctrine--the right to object to 'the expansion 
of military blocs or alliances' (i.e., NATO) into the region. 117 
It is curious that their policy towards Russia is rooted in realpolitik while the policy towards 
Eastern European countries including former Soviet Republics is based on international 
liberalism. In this case, it is necessary to admit that either the conception of "democratic 
peace" does not work, at least, not for Russia and efforts to strengthen democracy do not 
guarantee peace or that Russia is not on the road to democracy. 
116 Holger H. Mey, "View from Germany. New Members-New Missions: The Real Issues Behind the New NATO 
Debate," Comparative Strategy, vol. 3, no. 2, (1994), p. 226. 
117 B . k" 77 rzezms 1, p. . 
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Beyond ·a structural-level analysis it is necessary to examine how the national 
interests are defined on the level of political decision--making. In his· report to the US 
Congress Senator Lugar stressed: 
We laid down our objective and then worked with the Russians to 
achieve it. We seized the opportunity before the window closed. We knew 
what we wanted [which was German reunification]. In the case of Central 
Europe, we apparently do not. We need to define our interests and objectives 
and then to work with the Russians, not the other way around.118 
The aim of such a policy is not just to isolate Russia but to affect her national interests in 
order to shape them in accordance with American concerns. In his statement Assistant 
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Stephen Oxman stressed, "Russia's 
integration into the European community depends upon its acceptance of international 
standards of conduct outside its borders."119 Robert Zoellick agrees: "We should credit the 
Russians with the capability to pursue their own interests."120 However, he does not exclude 
the possibility of differences in Russian and American interests: 
Given the great uncertainties about Russia's political future, it would 
certainly be a mistake to try to fine-tune our policy to suit the twists and 
turns of Russia's internal debates. If Russia's reforms succeed, we will want 
to try to integrate it into what I hope will be growing transatlantic and global 
communities based roughly on our values. 121 
Thus, according to this approach the Russian national interests should be shaped by 
the United States and NATO and limited within Russian borders. Otherwise, as Zoellick 
noted: 
118 Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States 
Senate, p. 14. 
119 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House 
of Representatives (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994), p. 50. 
120 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 10. 
121 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Ambiguous US and Western reactions to instability and insecurity signal 
uncertainty and lack of commitment, which open the way for those tempted 
to establish their own order.122 
H. ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA 
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS 
Firm maximalists do not reject the idea of accommodation of the interests ofNATO 
and Russia through institutionalization of their relations. Regarding Russia as a defeated 
power in the Cold War they do not want "to lose" it in the post-Cold War period. As 
Senator Lugar stressed: 
The administration has undertaken a 'dual track' strategy to complement 
its intra-NATO deliberations on enlargement with an approach to Russia on 
possible institutional arrangements between NATO and the Russian 
Federation. 123 
Firm maximalists attach great importance to accommodation of the interests of NATO and 
Russia through institutionalization of their relations even in the case of the unfavorable 
scenario. Zoellick maintained: 
Even if Russia's reforms do not succeed, we will continue to have 
interest in working with Russia on topics like nuclear disarmament, 
proliferation, and regional stability.124 
This position can be explained by rich experience of doing business in the above-mentioned 
fields with the Soviet Union even when the Cold War was in full swing and deep 
understanding of the significance of these issues. Nevertheless, among maximalists there is 
a diversity of views on this issue. For example, such an extremely firm maximalist as 
Brzezinski has said: 
Pursuing geopolitical pluralism should also entail a more deliberate 
expansion of the scope and perimeter of European security. The deliberate 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., p. 2. 
124 Ibid., p. 9. 
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promotion of a larger and more secure Europe need not be viewed as an anti-
Russian policy, for the inclusion in NATO of several Central European 
democracies could be coupled with a simultaneous treaty of alliance and 
cooperation between NATO and Russia. 125 
But Brzezinski's understanding of cooperation is a peculiar one. He remarked: 
First of all, I am not saying that it is not necessary to cooperate with 
Russia. I am saying that mature cooperation cannot be now. A partner is the 
country which is ready to act mutually, effectively and responsibly with its 
allies. Russia is not a partner now. She is a client.126 
At the same time others regard Russia as an equal partner with her security 
anxieties. This position is based on two considerations. According to Zoellick, one of these 
is: 
... combining enlargement with discussions about a NATO--Russian 
treaty or new arrangements for security consultations in the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe--what was the old CSCE. 127 
On the other hand, as Stanley Sloan has argued: 
To deal with Russian concerns, Kissinger proposes a security treaty 
between NATO and Russia. According to Kissinger, such a treaty would 
make it clear that the NATO goal is to promote security cooperation, not 
confrontation in Europe. The NATO countries would accept limitations on 
deployment ofNATO forces on the territories of new members, and special 
new consultative procedures would be established between NATO and 
Russia. 128 
General Odom offered another institutional vehicle: 
NATO expansion has to be accompanied with some very other 
constructive policies on OSCE and bringing the Russians into the G-7. In 
125 B . k" 81 rzezms 1, p. . 
126 Segodnya~ August 19, 1994, p. 9. 
127 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
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other words, we must create a balance of power and structure for the rest of 
Europe as well. 129 
I. THE POSITION OF FLEXIBLE MAXIMALISTS 
Flexible maximalists consider that NATO enlargement is necessary but for reasons 
other than those cited by firm maximalists. 
J. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE POSITION 
The proponents of this approach, as Horelick noted, "Somehow recognize Russia's 
special status as a unique European power."130 They believe that Russia's status should be 
taken into account and Russia should be treated differently from other European countries. 
Flexible maximalists also consider that Russian foreign policy is not doomed to be 
imperialistic. Willing to agree that Russia is still in the process of a search for its place in 
post-Cold War Europe, this group thinks that though NATO enlargement is necessary it is 
not immediately aimed at Russia. They tend to perceive Russian national interests 
differently from firm maximalists and are more ready to accept the realities of such 
interests. 
In their opinion, NATO enlargement is connected with the promotion of 
democracy, but not with power projection in new territory and is not aimed against any 
particular country including Russia. They argue that, first, Russian national interests are less 
belligerent and, second, Russia is less capable of threatening other's interests. Flexible 
maximalists have a misgiving that Russia may be mistreated as a result of rapid NATO 
enlargement with elements of containment. In The Christian Science Monitor Moffett noted 
about the necessity to relinquish 
... the automatic assumption that Russia will once again be an 
expansionist power. That means treating Russia after the cold war like the 
129 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 40. 
130 Ibid., p. 15. 
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European powers treated France after the Napoleonic wars and Germany 
after World War II.131 
Flexible maximalists maintain that the main source of danger"to the interests of 
Western democracies and the countries in transition to democracy is regional instability. 
The proponents of this assessment do not indicate particular countries responsible for that. 
However, they suppose that Russia can become one of them. In this case an appropriate 
strategy could be crisis management. In their opinion, this strategy is aimed at localization 
of the crisis at an early stage for further solution. 
This strategy can be called "Crisis Management with Elements of Power Projection 
Strategy" which implies: 
• Low threat, long warning time, forward defense not imperative 
• No Allied presence on the territory of the Eastern European countries in 
peacetime; reliance on power projection in crisis 
• Requirement of the strong Allied mobility assets13
2 
The position of flexible maxirnalists on path to NATO enlargement is the 
following: 133 
Path Rationale Assumption Timetable Criteria Who Decides 
Evolutionary Part of overall No major Moderate fast Political, NATO, East-
Western security track economic Central Europe 
Integration problem 
Table 2. Flexible Max1mahsts Path to NATO Enlargement 
K. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Flexible maximalists do not regard Russia as an ultimately belligerent country. This 
is what an expert on NATO, retired General Galvin, said in the US Congress: 
131 Moffett. 
132 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 57. 
133 The infonnation is adapted fonn Ronald Asmus. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, p. 55. 
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If what we think we are interested in is continuing the old idea of forward 
defense and flexible response against the former Soviet Union or against 
Russia now, and if we go to these countries and say your criteria for joining 
NATO is that you build a powerful military force that we are satisfied with, 
what is that force for? Is that force for crisis management? Or is that a force 
because we are creating some kind of defense against Russia? We have to 
ask ourselves that hard question, because if we are asking Russia to be a 
partner with us and with other countries in maintaining the peace in Europe, 
then I think we are on the right track. If we are going to try to do something 
else, then I do not understand why we are going East. 134 
Those who share this approach are more willing to view Russia as a partner, though a 
difficult one, and are ready to take into account Russian interests in NATO enlargement. 
General Galvin noted: 
I think we should say to the Russians: An expanded NATO, under those 
circumstances with that strategy, equals peace and stability, and should be 
something that the Russians would support. And maybe even, be part of it. 
Now, this is very different from saying, 'We are going to expand to the East, 
in order to protect these countries.' Protect them, against what? We will 
then, therefore, have a response from the Russians. I am not saying that we 
have to be passing everything through the Duma in order to find out whether 
or not we can do it. 135 
Despite the fact that retired General Odom is more of a "firm maximalist," he gave a 
precise threat assessment to security in Europe typical for "flexible maximalists." At the 
discussions in the US Congress he noted: 
Our interests in Europe are facing growing and diverse threats-not the old 
Soviet military type threat, but a spectrum of diffuse and not always clear 
and present dangers. They are new in the sense that we did not face them in 
Central Europe during the cold war. They are old and familiar, however, if 
134 Jointly Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces of the Committee on Armed Services United States 
Senate, p. 108. 
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we recognize that we had to deal with precisely these kinds of threats in 
Western Europe in 1949."136 
L. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Flexible maximalists have a different approach from firm maximalists to the range 
of the sphere of Russian national interests. Analyzing sphere of influence, political scientist 
James Kurth noted: 
A great power will define the limits of its sphere according to its shifting 
perception of the diplomatic, economic, and military interests at stake. Most 
experienced diplomats, area specialists, and scholarly experts have a quite 
clear and consistent sense of what a particular great power considers to be its 
necessary and legitimate sphere of influence. It is grounded in historical and 
cultural traditions, which persist throughout the ups and downs of power and 
the zig and zags of interest. 137 
The proponents of this group agree, though to a greater or lesser extent that Russia 
being a great European country, has a wide sphere of interests going beyond Russian 
borders. They also agree that Russian national interests should be allowed to go beyond 
Russian borders, within former Soviet Republics, but provided, Russia not apply pressure to 
other countries or stoppage of gas supplies, against them. 
What differentiates the two groups of NATO enlargement proponents is their 
thinking in terms of sphere of influence. Firm maximalists do not agree to allowing any 
sphere of Russian national interests. But the common feature of these approaches is that 
they believe that the benefits of the enlargement outweigh the costs. More specifically what 
differentiates the two groups' views is to the extent to which they take into account Russian 
national interests and the size of the area of these interests. Flexible maximalists tend to take 
a more moderate approach. Stephen Oxman stated: 
136 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 29. 
137 James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy. A Pattern of History," The National Interest, no. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 
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We recognized that the countries of the East are different from each 
other. There would be a process of self-differentiation, and we felt this was a 
good way to meet that concern and to balance the various interests at 
stake.138 
They admit the possibility of the spreading of Russian national interests, within certain 
limitations, within the countries of the CIS. Firm maximalists, meanwhile reject that, 
insisting that Russian interests should remain within Russian borders. 
M. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA 
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS 
Taking into account the size of Russia and her difference as a power unique from 
other European countries, flexible maximalists consider that it is necessary to establish a 
special relationship between NATO and Russia. They also maintain that this 
accommodation of interests through institutionalization of NATO-Russia relations is 
significant for a number of reasons: 
1. Russia will not feel isolated and encircled by a hostile alliance. 
2. Accommodation of interests through institutionalization of NATO-Russia 
relations will promote an international environment more favorable for Russia. 
3. Transparency and predictability of the policies will be ensured. 
4. Russia's status as a great power in Europe will be confirmed. 
5. It will make it possible to influence and to bring closer to Western standards 
Russian policy-making. 
6. Russia will have an opportunity to express its views before NATO makes a 
decision, but not after. 
The special relationship with Russia is a goal and an instrument for the US and 
NATO at the same time. It is an instrument because: 
138 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House 
of Representatives (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1994), p. 3. 
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... the institutional web offers the West useful avenues to, procedures for, 
and ways of influencing strategic affairs outside its enlarged borders. 139 
N. THE POSITION OF MINIMALISTS 
The representatives of this group come out against NATO enlargement unless 
Russia goes sour. 
0. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
The theoretical foundation of the minimalists is based on the following 
considerations: 
• They reject historic or geopolitical predetermination of the foreign policy of any 
country in general and Russia in particular. The distinguished historian of 
Russia Martin Malia emphasized: "Nations are not constants. It is 
pseudowisdom to deduce future prospects mechanically from past 
precedents."140 Along this line Michael Mandelbaum specified what he thought 
about NATO enlargement and Russia. In his opinion: "Russia may again seek to 
disturb the peace of Europe but is not destined to do so. There is no national 
equivalent of a genetic predisposition to aggression. Neither Russia in general 
nor Russian foreign policy in particular is an impersonal, inevitable force of 
nature."141 
• The collapse of communism paved the way to democracy in Russia. Under 
present conditions NATO enlargement can hamper democratic processes in 
Russia. 
• The geopolitical changes created an international environment which Russia 
could perceive as non-hostile and basically compatible with Russian national 
interests. 
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The task of the West is to do its best to facilitate strengthening this trend, taking into 
af'('Ount Russian concerns and interests. The most rational way to accomplish that is to 
preserve the status quo in Europe for some time. An attempt to change the present situation 
by NATO enlargement could break the fragile balance of interests. Arnold Horelick has 
called this attitude: 
A neo-Wilsonian internationalist belief in the cardinal importance of 
promoting Russia's democratic development and integration into the 
Western-led international community with a more hardnosed Russocentric 
view that basic national security interests require a priority on maintaining 
stable conditions for U.S.-Russian cooperation in managing nuclear 
weapons command and control, nuclear reduction and dismantling.142 
Looking at this issue from the standpoint of realpolitik, the great power statesman's 
responsibilities, according to Fareed Zakaria, are: 
... to maximize his country's security and influence in the world; to allow 
for the inevitable shifts in international power and prestige; and finally, to 
preclude or preempt a general war.143 
Insecurity is only one side of a coin when there is a disbalance of power. The other side is 
the perception of insecurity in the minds of policy-makers. So NATO enlargement cannot 
ensure security if only one side feels insecure. Coming back to the mentioned earlier 
Spykman's assertion that there is more safety in the balanced power than in the words of 
good intentions, Russian weakened capabilities pose less danger for the West and Russian 
neighbors than Western capabilities for Russia. In this light, it is not quite clear why 
Western leaders speaking about their good intentions are more trustworthy than Russian 
leaders speaking about the same. As George Kennan said recently: 
My goodness, look at our Monroe Doctrine; every great power is 
sensitive about having its immediate neighbors connected with another great 
military power.144 
142 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
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Former US Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock assessed the decision on NATO 
enlargement as an inadequate and dangerous line-drawing between the NATO members and 
Russia. He noted: 
To proceed with an automatic expansion or something that looked like 
one would be the political counterpart of France's attempt to avoid World 
War II by building a Maginot line. By focusing on the threats of the past, 
France failed to grasp the threats of the future, and that, Mr. Chairman, in 
my opinion is precisely the mistake the advocates of rapid NATO expansion 
make today.145 
Arguing with the proponents of NATO enlargement minimalists disagree with the 
assumption that NATO will bring stability in the region. They make a point that first of all, 
NATO is a military alliance but not a "club for democracies" or "a vehicle for market 
reforms." The former chief of staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Pat Holt 
wrote: 
NATO is not the only stabilizing influence available for Eastern Europe. 
NATO might even be more unsettling than stabilizing. Any expansion 
eastward would inevitably carry with it the aura ofNATO's cold-war origins 
as an anti-Soviet alliance. Efforts to disguise this are unlikely to succeed.
146 
Basically, opposing immediate NATO enlargement minimalists presume that as 
Moffett noted: 
The US needs to base its policy on actual Russian behavior ... "Integrate if 
possible, isolate if necessary."147 
Charles Kupchan warned in his report on NATO and cited by Moffett in The Christian 
Science Monitor. In this connection minimalists tend to adopt the following position:
148 
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Position Rationale Assumption Timetable Criteria Who Decides 
Strategic Respond to Enlargement not Situation in Strategic Events in Russia 
response Russian threat needed, unless Russia is 
Russia goes catalyst 
sour 
Table 3. ConnectiOn Max1mahsts Path to NATO Enlargement 
P. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT 
According to classical realist theory, there were "two keys for understanding 
international politics: the capabilities and the interests of states."149 In terms of power, 
Russian capabilities have declined and do not threaten the West. Besides, there are no 
indications that Russia has aggressive intentions towards its neighbors. Russia's national 
interests are to promote an international environment that is favorable to it. To a great extent 
the position of the opponents of NATO enlargement is based on their belief that Soviet 
ideology is truly extinct and that Russia no longer constitutes a threat to the West, at least 
at present. They consider that the Russian national interests are still in the process of 
formulation. This can be seen in the anxiety expressed by Dr. Horelick in his Congressional 
testimony that there are: 
... strategic consequences that NATO expansion is likely to have for 
Russia's long-term search for a new post-Soviet post-Communist identity, 
and for a place in the post-cold war world. 150 
The proponents of this approach believe that such a NATO move will push Russia in the 
wrong direction in this search. It will leave the country outside European security 
frameworks and will assume that Russian national interests are incompatible with NATO's 
interests. Horelick also stated: 
The other area concerns that are strongest for NATO lie to the south 
rather than to the east of NATO Europe. 151 
149 William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," International Security, vol. 19, no. 3 (Winter 
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He went on to say: 
I also made my point, that whatever marginal contribution it makes to 
enhance the sense of secure well-being of East Central Europe, yvhich in my 
judgment, is not physically threatened for the foreseeable future by 
Russia. 152 
And Ambassador Matlock maintained: 
The most serious potential security threat to Europe as a whole is not 
likely to be from a resurgent, imperialistic Russia sweeping over and 
absorbing other nations as it has at times in the past, but a Fragmented 
Russia in which weapons of mass destruction in its possession slip out of its 
responsible control. 153 
Q. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Minimalists attitude to the sphere of Russian national interests is based on the 
assumption that Russia being a great power has its own legitimate interests and security 
concerns outside its borders. At the structural level the conceptual position of the 
minimalists can be explained by George Kennan's above-mentioned attitude to NATO 
enlargement and Russia. This attitude is in line with the idea expressed by the scholar James 
Kurth: 
A full and formal expansion of NATO into these countries [Central 
European countries] would threaten Russia's conception of its vital security 
interests154 
In a way, what he offers is in accord with the approach of Stephen Van Evera, who noted: 
Eastern Europe's status should be settled by 'Finlandizing' the region: 
the West would promise not to incorporate East European states into 
151 Ibid., p. 12. 
152 Ibid., p. 39. 
153 Ibid., p. 82. 
154 James Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," The National Interest, no. 43 (Spring 1996), p. 16. 
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Western military alliances or to base forces on their territory, while the 
Soviet Union would guarantee their complete domestic freedom. 155 
Though the Soviet Union does not exist today and it is too late to speak about full 
realization of the offer of "Finlandizing" the region, this idea is similar to Kurth's, also 
aimed at keeping the balance of security interests of all sides concerned. Kurth stated: 
A viable model for the future of Central and Eastern Europe may be 
found in the Cold War past of NATO's Northern Flank. Each of these three 
northern countries [Finland, Sweden, and Norway] was politically 
independent both superpowers during the Cold War, but their security 
positions were different. Finland was formally neutral, but within the Soviet 
security zone. Sweden was formally neutral, but maintained the military 
capability to defend its neutrality. Norway was formally a member of 
NATO, but it did not allow the stationing of NATO troops on its territory, as 
northern Norway bordered upon Soviet territory and vital security interests. 
Together, these three North European countries spanned an East-West 
continuum between the Soviet and the NATO security realms .. 156 
Kurth also stated that the future geopolitical landscape could comprise politically 
independent and military neutral Ukraine, Belarus and Finland which could be inside the 
Russian security sphere. The Visegrad Four (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland), having close economic and cultural connections with the West and feeling attached 
to Western values, could be politically independent and keep their military neutrality like 
Sweden in the Cold War period. Being a member ofNATO Germany could have no foreign 
troops in its Eastern territory, like Norway during the Cold War period. 
In the hearings in the US Senate Fred Ikle emphasized: 
I could say it is more comfortable for the Germans to have the buffer of 
Poland between them and Russia that has sort of an unpredictable future and 
is full of turmoil, than to be the closest ally of Poland with an alliance border 
then facing Belarus ... In the harsh cold war era, we saw certain merit in 
having Sweden outside of NATO. Certainly, the Norwegians saw it that 
way. It probably helped keep Finland out of the Soviet grip as there was a 
155 The Cold War and After, Sean M. Lynne-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds. (.London, 1994), p. 237. 
156 Kurth, "America's Grand Strategy," p. 16. 
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certain balance established by having Finland and Sweden outside, and 
Norway inside.157 
The driving force of this approach is an attempt not only to understand Russian 
national interests but to seek a possible compromise to take them into account. Though this 
approach may not be shared by so many scholars and politicians, but it testifies the diversity 
of the possible solutions. 
The minimalists indicate that Russia, being interested in a favorable international 
environment, has legitimate interests in keeping this environment in Eastern Europe. In this 
relation NATO enlargement interferes in this zone and can be regarded as threat to Russia. 
Mandelbaum stressed this possibility: 
That Russia would regard the new configuration of European security 
that an expended NATO would produce as illegitimate because it had been 
imposed over Russian opposition, even as Germany considered the post-
World War I settlement an illegitimate "dictated" peace.158 
Another potentially dangerous development is that the procedure of the change of the 
present geopolitical landscape in Eastern and Central Europe is different from the previous 
procedure. As Mandelbaum noted: 
It is significant that all the modifications in Europe's security from 1987 
to the present, the net effect of which has been dramatically to reduce 
Russian power, have occurred with Russian consent. NATO expansion 
would mark a departure from that pattern.159 
The dramatic change of the above-mentioned pattern and the tendency to disregard Russia's 
opinion was noticed by Richard Pipes. He stated: 
Certainly Russia should not be treated as a banana republic and subjected 
to military pressures without due consideration of its legitimate interests and 
wishes. To do so would only isolate Russia and provide ammunition to 
157 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, p. 38. 
158 Michael Mandelbaum, "Preserving the New Peace. The Case Against NATO Expansion." Foreign Affairs vol. 
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those extremist elements which insist that their country must once again 
build up a formidable military force because no matter what it does, it is 
doomed to be treated by the West as an enemy.160 · 
In general, Mandelbaum's theoretical approach on some issues related to 
geopolitical realities and spheres of influence is different from that of the maximalists. He 
considers that it is wrong to assess the present situation in Europe from the standpoint of 
classical balance-of-power theory. Arguing against proponents of NATO enlargement about 
the necessity to fill the security vacuum in Central Europe Mandelbaum responded: 
In fact, there is no such vacuum. The foundation of a new and radically 
different security order is in place. It consists of the remarkable serious of 
arms control accords, covering nuclear and conventional weapons ... 
Together these agreements form an arrangement that Europe has never had, 
a common security order based not on the age-old balance of power but 
rather on consensus and cooperation.161 
Such a notion as a sphere of influence vs security vacuum is a complicated issue to 
tackle. Looking at Mandelbaum's approach, it is noticeable that it differs not only from a 
maximalist one, but to some extent even from that of such minimalists as Kurth. 
Minimalists also focus on the correlation between sphere of influence and a "zone of 
instability" in Eastern Europe. Some of them consider that NATO enlargement will lead to 
alterations in the established spheres of influence of Russia and the West. Such a possibility 
can ignite instability and provoke Russia. As Fred Ikle has stated: 
Limited expansion would merely push the "zone of instability" further to 
the east while implicitly consigning those nations not tapped for 
membership to a Russian sphere of influence.162 
160 Richard Pipes, "Should NATO Expand?" World View, August 22, 1996. 
161 Mandelbaum, p. 12. 
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R. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA 
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS· 
Minimalists attach big importance to the accommodation of the relations of NATO 
and Russia through institutionalization of their relations. The foundation of their approach 
comprises the following aspects: 
First, they maintain that Russia should be involved in the system of European 
security as an equal partner. According to Holt: 
The optimum outcome would be for Russia, the big loser in the cold war, 
to play in the East the role that Germany, the big loser in World War II, has 
played in the West. That may be impractical, but the thrust of US and 
European policy ought to be to involve Russia, not to isolate or contain or 
ostracize it.163 
Minimalists consider that Russia may regard NATO enlargement as a neocontainment 
strategy aimed at the isolation of Russia, its alienation from European security, and its 
encirclement by the West. In Ambassador Matlock's opinion: 
l\:fuch of recent Russian recalcitrance can be traced to a feeling that their 
country is being left out of European security club. As a loner, Russia will 
always be a problem.164 
Second, it is more urgent to find ways to accommodate Russian interests with 
NATO's. As lkle stated: 
The most promising avenue still remains, in my view for the United 
States to see whether we can build a cooperative, mutually supportive 
relationship with Russia. As today, this goal still seems more important than 
tidying up loose ends in Eastern Europe.165 
In Ambassador Matlock's view: 
163 Holt. 
164 Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75. No. 3. p. 49. 
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Washington must assure Moscow that it places a high priority on creating 
a European security structure to which Russia is a party. Whether that is 
done through a treaty relationship between Russia and NATO, an 
augmentation of the authority of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, or some other mechanism is less important than the 
commitment to include Russia. NATO expansion to the east should be 
deferred while these arrangements are under active negotiations, provided 
Russia does not threaten other countries or seriously violates its OSCE 
obligations.166 
S. THE US OFFICIAL POSITION 
This chapter will focus on the official US vision of Russian national interests in 
NATO enlargement. For this purpose the same dimensions will be used. Along with these 
dimensions the analysis will be aimed at determining if this position coincides with either 
one of the maximalists or minimalists or may be different from all of them. 
T. ATTITUDE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT 
According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement" 
NATO enlargement is aimed at dealing with instability or the possibility of conflicts in 
Eastern Europe. Speaking about NATO, President Clinton emphasized 
NATO does not depend upon an ever-present enemy to maintain its unity 
or its usefulness. The alliance strengthens all of its members from within and 
defends them from threats without. There is no other cornerstone for an 
integrated, secure, and stable Europe for the future. The new democracies of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union want to be a part 
enlarging the circle of common purpose, and in so doing, increasing our own 
security.167 
U. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
According to the US official position its policy towards Russia is aimed at 
promoting democracy. The fate of Russia is closely connected with success or failure of its 
166 Matlock, "Dealing with a Russia in Turmoil," p. 49. 
167 
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attempts at democracy. The US is interested in Russia being a democratic country and 
Russian values consistent with Western democratic values. In his remarks to students of 
Moscow State University, President Clinton highlighted as a condition of success of the 
reforms "Continuing to strengthen your democracy."
168 Great importance is attached to the 
destiny of democracy in Russia because its failure calls peace into question. Secretary of 
State Christopher stressed: 
NATO is fulfilling its enduring mission by meeting new challenges. It is 
helping us overcome what are now the most immediate threats to the 
stability of Europe: the fragility of democratic institutions in Central Europe 
and the former Soviet Union.169 
According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement:" 
Russia is a key state in this [regard]. If we can support and help 
consolidate democratic and market refoims in Russia ... we can help tum a 
former threat into a region of valued diplomatic and economic partnership.
170 
NATO enlargement is regarded as one of the ways to move democratic countries closer to 
Russia, ensuring the development of democracy there. This view is based on the idea of 
"democratic peace" and is liberal internationalism. 
Testifying that while geopolitical and cultural determinism is a widespread 
phenomenon, Deputy Secretary Talbot denounced it: 
There are plenty of voices ... They are saying that it [war in Chechnya] 
proves Russia is country doomed--for reasons of geography, political 
culture, and history--to an authoritarian, if not totalitarian domestic order, 
and to aggressive, imperialistic international behavior. Our view is different. 
We don't believe in historical or geographical determinism. History and 
geography are hugely important factors, of course, in any state's identity and 
destiny. But we should be beware of stereotypes about national character, 
particularly ones that would--if they become the basis of policy--consign 
168 
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whole peoples to dictatorship on the perverse theory that that is the kind of 
government they deserve, or the political system encoded in their genes.171 
The official position taking into account geopolitical factor does not regard its 
impact as inevitable and unconditional. 
Giving an assessment of the position of the proponents of geopolitical determinism-
-namely, firm maximalists--the Director of the Policy Planning Staff James Steinberg noted: 
Some recommend that we base our relations with Russia and China on 
classical balance of power considerations. They would take it as a given that 
Russia is doomed to authoritarianism at home and expansionism abroad ... 
We reject such notions of geopolitical and cultural predetermination.172 
Nevertheless, there is a ground to consider that this position is not that simple and contains 
a geopolitical approach. The same Steinberg stated: 
By virtue of their size, geography, and potential economic, political, and 
military power, they [Russia and China] can still have a profound effect on 
the security and well-being of all our citizens-for good and for ill.173 
Besides geopolitical determinant, historical determinant can also be traced in this position. 
For example, Steinberg remarked: 
Without question, history and geography will tug Russia's leaders in 
predictable--and sometimes dangerous--directions. 174 
At the discussion in the US Congress on the future of NATO, Senator Lieberman 
remarked upon some historic factors determining Russian politics: 
One is the historic inclination towards empire of Russia--a territorial 
outreach. And the second is the historic strength of Russia and Germany, the 
tension between them, and the way in which people in between have been 
caught and suffered as a result of that great power of Russian-German 
tension. In other words, why not act now to make sure that those historic 
171 
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tendencies, particularly the Russian inclination to empire, is checked now 
and does not have an opportunity to appear later?175 
Asked to comment on this statement Richard Holbrooke replied: 
I agree completely with your description of Russian-German history and 
the vacuum of the lands in between. That is where the wars started.
176 
It is significant that Holbrooke described only geopolitical and historic factors affecting 
Russian foreign policy and to some extent Germany's. It is not clear why Germany, being 
NATO member, democratic and consequently less militant and war-prone, should be 
spoken of in the same terms as marginally democratic Russia. This approach does not fit the 
US official position. At the TV press-conference Holbrooke maintained that in the post-
Cold War period European politics returned to traditional pre-Soviet international politics. 
In this perspective foreign policy will be based not on ideological factor but on national 
interests. Thus, it is possible to assume that the phenomenon of geopolitics is likely to 
reemerge and to influence foreign policies. It is possible to assume that both Holbrooke's 
statement and Steinberg's contradictory statements bring to light the fact that geopolitical 
and historical determinism, despite official statements of the US leaders to the contrary, is 
present and can have an impact on the US policy-making in relation to Russia. 
Steinberg also raised another important, in his opinion, dependence: 
As we deal with China's and Russia's foreign policies, we are not 
indifferent to internal political developments. This is not simply because we 
are troubled by repressive practices on human rights alone--although we are 
deeply concerned by them--but also because we believe there are important 
linkages between what happens internally and how nations behave 
externally .177 
175 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Air/and Forces Committee on Armed Services United States Senate (US 
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This is an example of another perceived determinism in Russian foreign policy. These 
determinants make an argument for NATO enlargement from the realpolitik prospective. To 
a great extent such an assessment is in accordance with the geopolitical ~assessment of firm 
maximalists, who, like Kissinger and Brzezinski consider that Russia is doomed to be an 
imperialistic country despite the fact that the ideological factor has disappeared from 
Russian politics. 
However, in spite of certain contradictions in the theoretical foundation of the US 
official position, all agree that Russia's future is impossible to forecast precisely. For 
example, Steinberg remarked: 
As we approach the 21st century, Russia and China are both embarking 
on treacherous and, often, unpredictable paths of transformation in domestic 
as well as foreign policy. 178 
Talbot admitted the significance of the force of inertia determining Russian politics: 
We do not--we cannot--know for sure what kind of state Russia will be in 
the 21st century. 179 
Examining the theoretical foundation of the US official position, it is possible to 
come to the conclusion that it is contradictory, both in terms of official statements in general 
and of pursued policy of NATO enlargement in particular. The US objective to enlarge 
NATO is based on the idea of "democratic peace," but at the same time the policy of 
realpolitik is evident when it is declared that one of the aims of enlargement is to fill the 
security vacuum in Central Europe and to tackle the problem of instability in the region. On 
the one hand, this is realpolitik because NATO enlargement will occur despite democratic 
development in Russia. On the other hand, this is liberal internationalism because NATO 
enlargement is connected with the pace and the direction of the democratic development in 
Russia. But in any way, there is a reason to call into question the US public official 
178 Ibid., p. 392. 
179 
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statements that NATO enlargement is not aimed at any particular country including Russia. 
Michael Dobbs noted: 
Until now, the principal American rationale for NATO expansion has 
been the desire to consolidate free market democracy in eastern and central 
Europe. In private, however, U.S. officials say that plans for NATO 
expansion could be accelerated if Russia turns aggressive.
180 
Thus, in terms of theoretical foundation the US official position can be described as a 
combination of geopolitics, which is a part of realpolitik, and liberal internationalism. That 
is why it is logical to assume that official visions of Russian national interests may be also 
contradictory. 
The official US position boils down to the following strategy which can be called 
"Mixed Power Projection and Forward Presence with Elements of Neocontainment." The 
strategy implies: 
• Russian medium/low threat. 
• Collective defense model with limited joint posture. 
• Emphasis on reinforcement, defensive infrastructure on the territory of the 
Eastern European countries. 181 
According to the official US position the path of NATO enlargement may be the 
following: 182 
180 Michael Dobbs, "White House Preparing For Possible Yeltsin Loss; U.S. Response to Israeli Vote May Serve as 
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Table 4. US Path to NATO Enlargement 
V. RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Examining Russian national interests in terms of threat it is necessary to note that 
according to Assistant Secretary of State Holbrooke the United States "recognizes Russia's 
special position and stature."184 Such an estimation distinguishes the country from others 
and does not coincide with the position of Brzezinski, who tends to downgrade the role of 
Russia and the significance of its interests. Secretary of State Christopher also stressed that 
the ''New Atlantic Community" could arise only "if we recognize Russia's vital role in 
As a necessary condition of Russian national interests being a threat to no one, 
including the United States President Clinton emphasized the dependence of success of the 
reforms in Russia on the following: 
183 Strobe Talbot, "Why NATO Should Grow?" The New York Review, August 10, 1995, p. 29. 
184 Richard Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," Foreign Affairs, vo!. 74, no. 2 (1995), p. 50. 
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Establishing your role in the world in away that enhances your economic 
and national security interest-not at the expense of your fi;i.ends and 
neighbors, but in cooperation with them.186 
Such an attitude falls in line with that of the flexible maximalists. 
In general, assessing Russian national interest, US officials held that they were not 
clear-cut enough. Steinberg maintained: 
They [Russia and China] both are struggling to define appropriate 
foreign, economic, and security policies ... while protecting their as yet ill-
defined national interests. 187 
This fact makes it difficult to pursue mutually acceptable policy, especially, when high-
level Russian officials take different position on NATO enlargement. The former Secretary 
of the Security Council Alexander Lebed has stated that NATO enlargement did not pose 
any serious threat, at least, in the foreseeable future, while Defense Minister General 
Rodionov has talked of the threat to Russia of NATO enlargement. 
Despite the fact that Russian and American interests may not be compatible on all 
issues, the American side does not regard it as an impasse in the relations. As Secretary of 
State Christopher noted: 
We work with Russia whenever our interests coincide, and that has 
certainly produced very positive results as you heard me say before: a 
reduced nuclear threat... At the same time, it is only realistic and pragmatic 
to recognize that there are areas where we do not agree, where our interests 
seem to differ, and we try to be very candid with the Russians and to 
manage these differences so as to protect our interests.188 
NATO enlargement falls into such a category, where Russian and American interests are 
not identical. But so far American leaders view it is an issue for discussion but not 
confrontation. 
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Indicating the variety of threats to Russian national interests, Steinberg stated: 
In addition to a series of real and imagined threats from the south, Russia 
must also contend with the prospect of being isolated ... 189 
At this point Steinberg referred to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the 
Duma (the lower house of the Russian Parliament) Vladimir Lukin, who said that Russia 
would find itself between "two Europes." One will be Europe of the European Union, 
including Central Europe and East-Central Europe as a result of NATO enlargement, and 
another "Europe" of the democratic and fast -developing countries to the east of Russia, 
meaning Asian democracies. Although Steinberg abstains from giving personal assessment 
to the validity of the threat the fact that he quoted Lukin indicates that he believes such a 
probability cannot be excluded. 
The official US position acknowledges that Russian national interests by themselves 
cannot be a threat. However, it is necessary to examine the national interest as a tool or a 
political action. It would be reasonable to focus on how or by what means the goals in 
foreign policy are achieved. In this connection the US official view is that if "pragmatic 
policy of engagement" succeeds it that, as Steinberg maintained, "can help bring Russia to 
pursue its interests in ways consistent with international norms."190 Thus, there is yet 
another requirement which Russia should meet in order to avoid the perception of her 
interests as threatening. Today, however, the character of Russian foreign policy aimed at 
achieving national interests can pose a threat to the West under certain conditions. In 
particular, Steinberg drew attention to the fact that: 
... the increasingly assertive tone of Russia's leaders on a whole range of 
foreign policy issues stands in sharp contrast to the intense weakness of 
today's Russian state.191 
The Russian attitude to NATO enlargement is an example of such a tough policy. 
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W. THE SPHERE OF RUSSIAN NATIONAL INTERESTS 
According to "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and EDlargement:" 
It [NATO enlargement] will help assure that no part ofEuropd will revert 
to a zone of a great power competition or a sphere of in:fluence.
192 
The US officials have been reticent about such the notion of a sphere of Russian interests in 
terms of the territorial dimension. They prefer to speak, as Secretary of State Christopher 
did, about: 
... a number of critical security issues where Russia has special interests 
or capabilities. These include nuclear non-proliferation, implementing the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, building confidence in the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as nuclear safety and the prevention of 
nuclear smuggling.193 
Only at lower bureaucratic level American officials hint about such a thing as an 
area or a sphere of Russian national interests. For example, Steinberg maintained: 
We do not underestimate the risks and challenges Russia faces during the 
transition period. Many of Moscow's most critical foreign policy dilemmas 
lie in sensitive areas close to home.194 
In this line Under Secretary for Policy, Department of Defense Frank Wisner gave a clear 
indication where the zone of Russian national interests could be located: 
It would be very far from the Russian definition of what would be in that 
country's real interest. They have a different sphere of influence they are 
thinking of. They have developed their own alliance system. The CIS is the 
framework that they have been talking about.195 
Looking at this position it is possible to conclude that regardless of whether thinking 
in terms of zones or spheres is good or bad it is present. The evidence of this is the 
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consideration that there is security vacuum in Central Europe while Eastern Europe is the 
zone of instability. The fact that high-level US officials prefer not to articulate their 
assessments of Russian foreign policy in terms of the sphere of Russian national interests 
indicates their desire to avoid any possibility of being accused of line-drawing. As President 
Clinton emphasized: 
NATO expansion should not be seen as replacing one division of Europe 
with another one. It should, it can, and I am determined that it will increase 
security for all European states--members and non-members alike.196 
X. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE INTERESTS OF NATO AND RUSSIA 
THROUGH INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THEIR RELATIONS 
US officials are fully aware of the reality that Russian national interests and those of 
NATO on NATO enlargement may not coincide for some time. In the official US view it is 
not a tragedy because NATO enlargement is not aimed at line-drawing. The US seeks 
bridge the gap between the Russian and American positions, while keeping NATO 
enlargement going. The task is to accommodate Russian and American interests. As 
President Clinton emphasized: 
In parallel with expansion, NATO must develop close, strong ties with 
Russia. The alliance's relationship with Russia should become more direct, 
more open, more ambitious, and more frank. 197 
According to this position, Russian and American national interests should be 
accommodated not only through establishing a Russian-NATO relationship. As Secretary of 
State Christopher stressed: 
We outlined a comprehensive vision of European security that includes 
an expanded NATO, a strengthened OSCE, and the development of new and 
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cooperative relationships between Russia and NATO as well as with other 
international institutions.198 
This balance of interests, arranged through the institutionalization of the relationship, can 
play the role of a tool to accommodate them and to work out common approaches to 
common problems. This is especially important now because of the contradictory Russian 
and American assessments of NATO enlargement. Secretary Christopher noted that the US-
Russian relationship: 
... allows us to deal with our differences--even sharp ones--and to manage 
them without threatening to blow up the world. We have a very complex, 
multi-faceted, and broad relationship, and it is important that it not be held 
hostage to any single issue or reduced to a single issue.
199 
In more concrete terms, Russian-American accommodation of interests can take place 
through established and signed programs like Partnership for Peace and membership-for 
example, Russia's membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)--as well 
as with new ones designed especially for Russia and NATO. In particular, Secretary 
Christopher underlined the openness of the America's position on broad cooperation with 
Russia, saying: 
Russia can take an important step by providing a positive response to 
NATO's proposal for a political framework that includes permanent 
consultative arrange~ents. 200 
Steinberg spoke about a "Closer relationship between Russia and NATO, both through the 
Partnership for Peace and through enhanced NATO-Russia links."
201 Secretary Christopher 
offered as an option a special charter with Russia before the enlargement occurs. In his 
opinion, "the charter would provide a permanent mechanism for crisis management, making 
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it possible for NATO and Russia to respond immediately to eventual challenges."202 Also 
according to Christopher: 
NATO and Russia need a charter because we share an" interest in 
preventing armed conflict. That is why we seek a fundamentally new 
relationship between Russia and the new NAT0.203 
These views expressed by top and high-ranking US officials indicate that 
accommodation of the Russian and American national interests through institutionalization 
of the relations is as indispensable as NATO enlargement itself. It is also an indication that 
the US side is not only aware of the fact that Russia perceives NATO enlargement as a 
potential threat to it interests. It is also seeking an opportunity to achieve two ends 
simultaneously. On the one hand, a powerful military alliance moves closer to Russian 
borders leaving Russia out of its zone of security, on the other hand, it is aimed at not 
"losing" Russia, and at accommodating Russian interests through cooperation 
arrangements. As it is intended, such a US approach makes it possible to make Russian-
American relations more transparent and easy to affect both in time of crisis and 
tranquillity. 
202 Sonia Winter, "Russia: Christopher Proposes NATO Charter For Russia," Radio RFFJRF, September 9, 1996. 
p.l. 
203 Ibid., p. 1. 
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IV. SOCIOLOGICAL SURVEY 
The sociological survey was conducted at the Department of National Security 
Affairs of the Naval Postgraduate School in September 1996. The purpose of the survey is 
to gauge/analyze American attitudes toward Russian national interests vis-a-vis NATO 
enlargement. The number of respondents was seventy-six. They were students-military 
officers of different services. The participants in the survey were anonymous. 
In the survey the following definitions were used: 
• Survival National Interests: are interests which, if challenged, place "the very 
existence of the nation" in peril. For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis, when 
there was a possibility of a short-notice, large-scale nuclear strike. 
• Vital National Interests: are interests which, if challenged, will result in a 
"high probability of serious harm" to the security of the nation unless strong 
measures (including military ones) are taken by the government within a short 
period of time. For example, an attack on international oil resources. 
• Major National Interests: are interests which, if challenged, could result in the 
"potential for harm" if no action is taken to counter an unfavorable trend abroad. 
For example, drug trafficking in Latin America. 
• Peripheral National Interests: are interests which, if challenged would result 
in "little if any harm" to the entire nation if a "wait and see policy" is adopted by 
the government. For example, the change of the government in Turkey.204 
204 This information was adapted from Neuchterlein p. 9-13. 
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Figure 6. Question 1 
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Figure 7. Question 2 
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4. How dangerous is NATO enlargement to the creation of an international 
















Total Respondents 76 
Figure 9. Question 4 
87 
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Figure 10. Question 5 
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6. NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russia's ability to pursue its national 















Total Respondents 7 6 
Figure 11. Question 6 
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7. NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russia's ability to pursue its national 
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9. It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against 
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Total Respondents 76 
Figure 14. Question 9 
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Figure 15. Question 10 
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11. Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular 
US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with 
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12. It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture 
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Figure 17. Question 12 
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A. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 
1. Question One 
NATO enlargement should not occur because it threatens Russian national 
interests? 
Answering the first question the overwhelming majority of respondents 59 out of76 
consider that NATO enlargement should occur. Only 9 disagree and 8 do not have any 
opinion on the issue. This data indicates that there is strong support for NATO enlargement 
among American military. This position falls in line with the approach of both groups of 
maximalists and the US official position. 
2. Question Two 
How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian military se~urity? 
Assessing Russian military security in NATO enlargement, 37 respondents consider 
that the level of intensity of the challenged interest is major and 9 consider it vital and 30 
peripheral. The fact that 37 and 9 respective respondents believe that NATO enlargement 
falls into the category of Russia's vital and major interests tends to indicate that a) the 
enlargement deals with Russia; and b) it can be defined as the policy of neocontainment. 
This roughly equal distribution of responses means that all positions are represented. This 
fact confirms the controversy and complexity ofthe issue ofNATO enlargement. 
3. Question Three 
How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian economic-well being? 
NATO enlargement challenges Russian economic well-being at the level of 
peripheral interest for 39 respondents. It is survival for 2 respondents, vital for 7, and major 
for 27. This trend reveals that Russian economic well-being is not going to be seriously 
affected though it is necessary to admit that in general the tendency can hardly be called 
insignificant, bearing in mind that 36 respondents do not perceive NATO enlargement as a 
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Russian peripheral interest. The division line here is typical for minimalists and other 
groups. 
4. Question Four 
How dangerous is NATO enlargement to the creation of an international 
environment that is favorable to Russia? 
Answering this question 34 respondents think that NATO enlargement challenges 
Russia's peripheral national interest. Meanwhile, 17 consider it as vital and 25 as major. 
The total number, 42, of these respondents indicates that the international environment for 
Russia in terms of favorability tends to be unstable as a result of NATO enlargement. The 
distribution of responses testifies to the proximity to the minimalists. 
5. Question Five 
How dangerous is NATO enlargement to Russian international prestige? 
Russian international prestige is challenged at the peripheral level of interest for 27 
respondents while for 2, 19 and 28 it is, respectively, at survival, vital, and major levels. 
This fact means that Russian international prestige may suffer as a result of NATO 
enlargement. The majority of the responses is closer to the position of the minimalists. 
6. Question Six 
NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national 
interests within Russian borders? 
The overwhelming majority of respondents, 73, do not agree that NATO 
enlargement is aimed at interfering Russian domestic policies. This position falls in line 
with the position of both maximalist groups and with the US official one. 
7. Question Seven 
NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national 
interests within parts of the former Soviet Union (for example Ukraine, Belarus, 
etc.)? 
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Commenting on this statement the majority of respondents, 45, disagrees with it. It 
means that there is a tendency to regard the parts of the former Soviet Union as the sphere 
of Russian national interests. Though on the other hand, the number of those who agree, 26, 
indicates that there is a fairly strong opposition to it. It may lead to the conclusion that under 
some circumstances NATO enlargement may affect Russia's national interests in the parts 
of the former Soviet Union. Although so far this trend does not have a clear-cut shape. On 
the whole, this position is approximate to the one of minimalists and, to some extent, the 
US official one. 
8. Question Eight 
NATO enlargement is designed to limit Russian ability to pursue its national 
interests within the former Warsaw Pact countries (for example, Poland, Hungary, 
etc.)? 
Commenting on this statement the majority of respondents, 45, express their 
consent. It indicates that at the present stage NATO enlargement tends to reduce the area of 
Russia's national interests in the former socialist countries. Though, there is quite a big 
opposition of 30 respondents to it. This distribution means that there is a tendency in the 
students' opinions toward to the position of firm maximalists and the US official one. 
9. Question Nine 
It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against the 
US after NATO enlargement? 
The overwhelming majority of the respondents, 72, disagrees with the statement. 
This attitude testifies to the fact that being belligerent will do Russia no good. 
10. Question Ten 
It is in Russia's national interests to sign a NATO-Russia treaty on security 
cooperation? 
Sixty-five respondents uphold the idea that a NATO-Russian treaty on security 
cooperation is in Russia's national interests. It testifies that the possibility of such a treaty 
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can smooth the tension and bridge the gap between NATO and Russia. This position 
coincides with all the approaches. 
11. Question Eleven 
Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular 
US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with other 
NATO members? 
The idea of the United States having consultations with Russia before the US meets 
for regular consultations with other NATO members was not approved by 18 respondents. 
Meanwhile, 34 respondents support it. Nevertheless, taking into account that 24 have no 
opinion, there may be no strong support for it. 
12. Question Twelve 
It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture more 
directly posed against NATO following NATO enlargement? 
Commenting on this statement, 67 disagree with it. This fact leads us to the 
conclusion that it is in Russia's interest to resort to the policy "wait and see." 
B. RESPONDENTS' COMMENTARY 
In the survey the respondents were asked to comment on statements 9-12. Here are 
the most thought provoking commentaries, which testify to the variety of possible attitudes 
and views. 
1. Statement Nine 
It is in Russia's national interests to become internationally belligerent against the 
US after NATO enlargement? · 
Perceived threats against US could result in weakened relations and 
greatly increased US support for NATO, possibly to the point of further 
enlarging/increasing NATO powers. 
International belligerency towards the West would be counter to Russia's 
long-term national interests. It would only serve to isolate Russia from 
Europe. 
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NATO enlargement brings stability + better economic conditions to 
Eastern Europe. A non-belligerent Russia will be able to benefit from this 
through trade. 
Russia needs to stop worrying about everyone, this is a great opportunity 
to get her act together and take a position (strong) as a world leader. 
They cannot afford to. Russia needs help from the US and NATO 
countries economically. 
A lot of work has to be done in the former Soviet Union, we must all 
work together not in a vacuum. 
The US is not the only member of NATO. It would probably cause more 
problems between Russia and the Republics and Nations trying to join 
NATO. 
I believe Russia's time, effort and money would be better spent creating 
an economic environment (internally to Russia) that will blur the lines of its 
borders with its FSU [Former Soviet Union] States. 
2. Statement Ten 
It is in Russia's national interests to sign a NATO-Russia treaty on security 
cooperation? 
This seems to imply hostility between Russia and NATO. The 
relationship should be one of cooperation, not adversarial. To say a treaty is 
of national interest seems to imply they would be in danger otherwise. 
I think that a healthy dialogue between Russia and NATO is m 
everyone's best interests. 
Security treaties add to stabilization and eliminate perceived threats 
between signers. 
This would permit Russia to influence NATO affairs from within, not try 
to force them from without. 
"Engagement" could be economically and politically in Russia's interest. 
NATO has not, in its 50 + years history of existence, been an impingement 
on the rights/sovereignty/national interests of its member-nations and the 
same should be the case in a mutual security agreement. 
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Russia participation with NATO will allow Russia to continue her role as 
a superpower and have an influence in Europe. In addition, through 
cooperation Russia could tilt NATO interests in ways that would be 
favorable to Russia. 
3. Statement Eleven 
Following NATO enlargement, it is in Russia's national interests to hold regular 
US-Russian consultations before the US meets for regular consultations with other 
NATO members? 
US and Russia must communicate "before and after." Russia needs to be 
made part of process and made fully aware of what NATO is trying to do. 
I'm not sure what this would gain other than perhaps strengthening 
Russian position if the US is used as an advocate for Russian interests. 
The US should not meet with Russia over another country. Why should 
the US give Russia special attention other than what they warrant? 
It would help Russia to have more influence over the new members of 
NATO. 
This undermines the trust of other members ofNATO which weakens the 
overall organization. Russia + US have no reason to discuss issues separate 
from other members unless the issue is of no concern of other members. 
Meetings prior to NATO meeting could be very beneficial in terms of 
directing the meeting agenda as well as influencing the US/NATO 
decisions. 
I agree that US + Russia should hold regular consultations, but not in the 
context that Russia will use the US as a sounding board. 
The US is NATO. 
It would depend on the issues being discussed. If they have a direct 
impact on Russia, I believe it would be in Russia's best interest to consult 
with the US. However, if the regular NATO consultations do not affect 
Russian interests than Russian-US discussions could be seen unfavorably as 
meddling where Russia does not belong. 
US is the most powerful and influential NATO member. If Russia has 
concerns with potential NATO actions, voicing these concerns to the US 
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could avert actions contrary to Russian interests, and prevent NATO 
misunderstanding of Russian intentions or desires. (And vice versa). 
4. Statement Twelve 
It is in Russia's national interests to adopt a doctrine and deployment posture more 
directly posed against NATO following NATO enlargement? 
Why? To revert back to the "good old days" of the Cold War. Russia has 
nothing to fear from NATO ... Russia should participate more in PFP 
activities just to find out. 
Be part of solution, not the problem. 
I don't believe that NATO currently has hostile intent toward Russia, but 
if I were a Russian I would certainly want to monitor NATO very closely. 
Threat has two components: intention and capability. NATO may not have 
hostile intent, but has significant physical capability to cause harm to Russia. 
Russia's main threat comes from the south (Iran, Turkey, and Muslim 
fundamentalism) and the east (Japan+ China). 
Looking at the results of the survey and the respondents' commentaries, it is 
necessary to note that to varying degrees, they comprise the elements of all approaches 
examined in the project. This means that the students' collective position does not fully fit 
into any of the three unofficial positions or the official one. Nevertheless, if we take the firm 
maximalists and minimalists as the two extremes, the respondents' opinions will be in 




This thesis had the following basic purposes: 
I. To focus on the notion of the national interest from the viewpoint of political 
science theory: 
• To analyze the notion of the national interest on the basis of two 
approaches of realist school: namely, the power position and the security 
one, and 
• To classify the national interest and to introduce a matrix; 
2. To create and examine theoretical constructs of American unofficial views of 
Russian national interests in NATO enlargement and then to test two hypotheses 
connected with the official US position; 
3. To conduct a sociological survey to understand how American military officers 
view Russian national interests in NATO enlargement. 
The theoretical consideration of the notion of the national interest revealed the fact 
that both the power and security approaches are not devoid of drawbacks, although it is 
necessary to admit that the security one is less detrimental. Nevertheless, their critical 
investigation and classification testifies to the fact that this kind of examination of the 
theoretical background and the non-dogmatic use of the classification make it possible to 
take a more rational look at the notion of the national interest in international politics. 
Considering American views of Russian national interests in NATO enlargement, it 
is necessary to underline some points: 
• Because of the return to "traditional" foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
environment in Europe, the notion of the national interest is not obsolete and has 
a tendency to play a bigger role in a short-term perspective. 
• The diversity of American unofficial views on Russian national interests in 
NATO enlargement testifies to the complexity of the issue and a range of 
possible positions. What unites all of them is the perceived necessity to seek the 
105 
accommodation of the interests of NATO and Russia through the 
institutionalization of their relations, though different rationales are used to 
make this case. 
Tested hypotheses connected with the American official position led to the 
conclusion that Hypothesis #2, saying that: "The US official position does not fit either firm 
or flexible maximalists, or minimalists positions" is valid. The American official position 
comprises elements of all unofficial positions and is unique in its character. Looking at the 
official US position it is necessary to highlight the fact that it contains certain 
contradictions. On the one hand, it comprises elements of neocontainment vis-a-vis Russia. 
On the other hand, it is aimed at promoting friendly relations and partnership with Russia. 
The openly expressed opinions of the US leaders about the role of determinants in Russian 
foreign policy coincide with that of flexible maximalists, and are close to that of the 
minimalists. At the same time, paradoxically, their opinion runs counter to the opinion of 
James Steinberg, a senior official of the State Department, which coincides with the 
position of firm maximalists. On top of that, the official US position contains such features 
as a moderate fast-track NATO enlargement and some indications of consent for the zone of 
Russian interests in the CIS countries, both typical of flexible maximalists. On the whole, 
all these above-mentioned features prove that to a great extent, the official US position is 
controversial and not fully consistent with regard to Russia. It is possible to conclude that 
the mentality of the Cold War period is still alive. Thus, it may be likely that the US foreign 
policy will have its zig-zags toward Russia, especially if Russia stands by its opposition to 
NATO enlargement. 
The idea of preserving the neutral zone between the former Soviet Union and 
NATO, Germany in particular, was based on the agreement of the former Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev and his Western counterparts not to enlarge NATO toward the East. 
The change of the official US attitude can be explained by American disbelief in the 
developments of a benign Russia and belief in the necessity to take advantage of the 
moment to enlarge the NATO zone of security. Regarding NATO enlargement as an 
imminent projection of stability into Central and Eastern Europe, the present US 
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administration considers the former Soviet republics unlikely to become NATO members in 
the foreseeable future. Thus, although the "zone of instability" narrows it remains and, 
indeed, is likely to increase Russian insecurity. 
Anatol Lieven reports that the former US Ambassador to Russia Thomas Pickering 
wrote in his cable to Washington: "If Kiev is more secure, then Warsaw automatically 
becomes more secure, but this is not true the other way round." The Ambassador stated that 
"enhanced security" for Eastern European countries did not necessarily mean the same for 
the former Soviet republics. Thus, enlargement may lead to the opposite results in terms of 
regional security. 
On the whole, the consideration of official and unofficial American views of 
Russian national interests in NATO enlargement makes a contribution to a better 
understanding of American attitudes toward Russia in general. Understanding these 
attitudes behind official policy helps to establish transparent and predictable relations 
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